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The	   rapid	   growth	   of	   the	   populous	   Asian	   economies	   provokes	   profound	   economic	  
changes	  and	  a	  shift	   in	  the	  balance	  of	  power.	  On	  the	  economic	  front,	  Asian	   leaders	  
are	   confronted	  with	   the	  need	   to	  preserve	   the	   stability	   that	  has	  underpinned	   their	  
prosperity,	   maintain	   an	   environment	   conducive	   to	   trade	   and	   investments	   and	  
encourage	   domestic	   consumption	   while	   avoiding	   ecological	   disasters.	  
Internationally,	  business	  competition	  will	  intensify	  with	  the	  strong	  presence	  of	  Asian	  
manufacturers	  in	  global	  supply	  chains,	  growing	  price	  competition	  from	  Asian	  firms	  in	  
domestic	   markets	   and	   global	   competition	   for	   energy,	   food,	   minerals	   and	   other	  
commodities.	  Geopolitical	  concerns	  stem,	  in	  part,	  from	  Asia’s	  global	  quest	  for	  critical	  
resources,	   conflicting	   territorial	   and	   maritime	   disputes	   and	   increasing	   military	  
expenditures	   which	   affect	   security	   dynamics.	   China’s	   assertiveness	   over	   its	  
periphery	  prompts	   an	  arm’s	   race	   in	   the	   region	  and	   concerns	  about	   Sino-­‐American	  
relations	  even	  though	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  relations	  may	  be	  less	  risky	  than	  China’s	  relations	  
with	   its	   neighbours.	   The	   United	   States	   remains	   a	   key	   player	   in	   the	   Asia-­‐Pacific	  
region,	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  alter	  balances	  and	  affect	  outcomes.	  Globally,	  the	  United	  
States	   capacity	   to	   lead	   is	   now	   diminished	   and	   will	   continue	   to	   be	   so	   for	   the	  
foreseeable	  future.	  Since	  no	  rising	  power	  is	  capable	  of	  exercising	  global	  leadership,	  a	  
return	  to	  the	  "old	  normal"	  where	  no	  one	  power	   in	  geopolitical	  or	  economic	  terms	  




La	   croissance	   rapide	   des	   populeuses	   économies	   asiatiques	   crée	   des	   défis	  
économiques	   d’envergure	   et	   un	   déplacement	   de	   l’équilibre	   du	   pouvoir.	   Au	   plan	  
économique,	   les	   dirigeants	   asiatiques	   devront	   préserver	   la	   stabilité	   qui	   a	   soutenu	  
leur	   prospérité,	   maintenir	   un	   environnement	   propice	   au	   commerce	   et	   aux	  
investissements	   et	   encourager	   la	   consommation	   intérieure,	   tout	   en	   évitant	   les	  
désastres	  écologiques.	  Au	  niveau	  international,	   la	  concurrence	  s’intensifiera	  du	  fait	  
de	  la	  forte	  présence	  des	  fabricants	  asiatiques	  dans	  les	  chaînes	  d’approvisionnement,	  
la	   compétitivité	   croissante	   des	   entreprises	   asiatiques	   dans	   tous	   les	  marchés	   et	   la	  
concurrence	  mondiale	  pour	  l’énergie,	  la	  nourriture,	  les	  minéraux	  et	  autres	  denrées.	  
Les	  préoccupations	  géopolitiques	  sont	  alimentées,	  en	  partie,	  par	  la	  quête	  mondiale	  
des	  pays	  asiatiques	  pour	   les	   ressources,	   les	  différends	   territoriaux	  et	  maritimes	  et	  
                                                
1	  Senior	  Business	  Advisor	  at	  Dentons	  Canada	  LLP,	  Pierre	  Lortie	  has	  recently	  served	  as	  a	  member	  of	  
the	   Asia	   Pacific	   Foundation	   Taskforce	   to	   assess	   Canada’s	   strategy	   and	   future	   role	   in	   Asia	   Pacific	  
bilateral	   and	   regional	   institution.	   The	   opinions	   expressed	   in	   this	   Working	   Paper	   are	   those	   of	   the	  
author.	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l’augmentation	   des	   dépenses	   militaires	   qui	   affectent	   la	   sécurité	   régionale.	  
L’influence	   croissante	   de	   la	   Chine	   sur	   sa	   périphérie	   donne	   lieu	   à	   une	   course	   aux	  
armements	   et	   soulève	   des	   craintes	   quant	   aux	   relations	   du	   couple	   sino-­‐américain	  
même	   si	   les	   relations	   entre	   la	   Chine	   et	   les	   États-­‐Unis	   comportent	   probablement	  
moins	  de	  risques	  que	  ceux	  avec	  ses	  voisins	  immédiats.	  Les	  États-­‐Unis	  demeurent	  un	  
joueur	   incontournable	   dans	   la	   région	   Asie-­‐Pacifique	   capable	   de	   balancer	   les	  
équilibres	  de	  pouvoir	  et	  de	  tempérer	  les	  comportements.	  Globalement,	   la	  capacité	  
des	  États-­‐Unis	  à	  exercer	  un	   leadership	  mondial	  est	  diminué	  et	  continuera	  de	   l’être	  
pour	  l’avenir	  prévisible.	  Comme	  aucune	  nouvelle	  puissance	  n’est	  capable	  d’exercer	  
ce	  rôle,	  un	  retour	  à	  l’«	  ancienne	  normalité	  »	  où	  aucun	  pays	  ne	  domine	  le	  monde	  en	  




Lortie,	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Introduction	  
For	  over	  two	  centuries	  the	  West	  has	  dominated	  the	  world.	  At	  the	  dawn	  of	  the	  21st	  
Century,	  we	  are	  witness	  to	  an	  historic	  realignment	  where	  the	  nations	  of	  Asia,	  home	  
to	  over	  half	  of	  the	  world’s	  population,	  are	  playing	  an	  increasing	  leading	  role.	  Today,	  
the	   region	   is	   the	   world’s	   most	   dynamic	   economically.	   Three	   Asian	   countries	   are	  
amongst	  the	  ten	  largest	  national	  economies.	  The	  unprecedented	  level	  of	  economic	  
growth	  experienced	  by	  China	  and	   India	  –	   two	  very	  populous	  and	  continental-­‐sized	  
states	  –	  underpins	  the	  resurgence	  of	  Asia	  on	  the	  global	  scene.	  Consonant	  with	  this	  
secular	   shift	   in	   the	   center	   of	   gravity	   of	   economic	   might	   and	   the	   higher	   levels	   of	  
economic	   interdependence	  and	  competition	  globalisation	  entails,	  a	   realignment	  of	  
geopolitical	   power	   is	   occurring	   giving	   rise	   to	   tensions	   and	   concomitant	   security	  
challenges.	  
Looking	  ahead,	  the	  main	  economic	  policy	  challenges	  that	  will	  confront	  Asian	  leaders	  
will	   be	   to	   preserve	   the	   stability	   that	   has	   underpinned	   regional	   prosperity,	   to	  
maintain	   an	   environment	   conducive	   to	   trade	   and	   investments	   and	   to	   encourage	  
domestic	   consumption	  and	   the	  development	  of	   the	   services	   sector.	   In	   this	   regard,	  
we	  can	  take	  comfort	  from	  the	  resilience	  demonstrated	  by	  Asian	  countries	  during	  the	  
2008	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  Although	  the	  external	  shocks	  stemming	  from	  the	  global	  
financial	  crisis	  hit	  the	  region	  hard,	  the	  decline	  in	  output	  was	  shallower,	  the	  recovery	  
was	  more	  rapid,	  and	  the	  cumulative	  output	  loss	  was	  smaller	  in	  comparison	  to	  other	  
regions.	   Moreover,	   appropriate	   prudential	   policies	   ensured	   Asia’s	   financial	   sector	  
remained	  stable	  throughout	  this	  crisis.	  
Sustained	   fast	   economic	   growth	   is	   not	   manifest	   destiny.	   Already,	   we	   see	   China’s	  
growth	  slowing	  from	  two	  digits	  to	  7	  percent	  or	  less;	  India	  is	  on	  a	  similar	  growth	  path	  
and	   the	   relative	   stagnation	   of	   the	   Japanese	   economy	   continues	   to	   run	   its	   long	  
course.	   The	   broad	   domestic	   consequences	   stemming	   from	   these	   tamed	   growth	  
prospects	  defy	  definition	  and	  will	  reverberate	  worldwide	  because	  of	  the	  globalized	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and	   hyper	   connected	  world	   that	   prevails.	   Nonetheless,	   given	   the	   sheer	   size	   of	   its	  
economy,	  slower	  growth	  is	  unlikely	  to	  affect	  China’s	  rising	  power	  in	  world	  affairs.	  
A	  powerful	  indication	  of	  China’s	  rising	  economic	  dominance	  is	  that	  its	  currency,	  the	  
Yuan	  (CNY),	   is	   fast	  becoming	  a	  reference	  currency.	   In	  East	  Asia,	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  
co-­‐movement	   between	   the	   CNY	   and	   other	   currencies	   indicates	   that	   the	   CNY	   has	  
replaced	  the	  US	  dollar	  as	  the	  dominant	  reference	  currency.2	  In	  terms	  of	  use	  in	  global	  
payments,	   the	   CNY	   is	   in	   the	   fifth	   position,	   a	   rank	   which	   suggests	   that	   the	  
International	   Monetary	   Fund	   ("IMF")	   will	   soon	   endorse	   the	   CNY	   as	   one	   of	   the	  
world’s	   five	   reserve	   currencies.	   The	   recent	   agreement	   to	   establish	   the	   first	   CNY	  
trading	   hub	   in	   the	   Americas	   in	   Toronto	   is	   a	   key	   step	   for	   the	   commercial	  
internationalization	  of	  the	  CNY	  and	  its	  development	  as	  a	  global	  reference	  currency.3	  	  
The	  global	  quest	   for	  critical	   resources,	   conflicting	   territorial	  and	  maritime	  disputes	  
and	   increasing	   military	   expenditures	   are	   affecting	   regional	   security	   dynamics.	   In	  
contrast	   to	   the	   extensive	   networks	   of	   economic	   arrangements	   that	   have	   been	  
instrumental	   in	   facilitating	   regional	   trade,	   political	   institutions	   and	   stability-­‐
enhancing	  mechanisms	   to	  mitigate	  and	  manage	  conflicts	  within	   the	   region	   remain	  
weak	  and	  inchoate,	  a	  legacy	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  cleavages	  and	  the	  strong	  conviction	  of	  
the	   10	   ASEAN	   members	   that	   institutional	   flexibility	   is	   necessary	   to	   avoid	   the	  
dominance	  of	  regional	  organizations	  by	  China	  or	  the	  United	  States.4	  China’s	  growing	  
assertiveness	   in	  establishing	  its	  dominion	  over	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	   its	  periphery	  
raises	   geopolitical	   concerns.	   In	   this	   day	   and	   age,	   it	   cannot	   implement	   a	  Western	  
Pacific	   version	   of	   the	  Monroe	  Doctrine	  without	   encountering	   stiff	   opposition.	   The	  
                                                
2	  Arving	  Subramanian	  and	  Martin	  Kessler,	  The	  Renminbi	  Bloc	  Is	  Here:	  Asia	  Down,	  Rest	  of	  the	  World	  to	  
Go?,	  Peterson	  Institute	  for	  International	  Economics,	  WP	  12-­‐19,	  August	  2013.	  In	  May	  2014,	  only	  3%	  of	  
North	  American	  payments	  with	  China	  were	  executed	  in	  RMB	  whereas	  this	  ratio	  was	  29%	  for	  the	  Euro	  
Zone.	  
3	   Aizenman,	   Joshua,	   The	   Internationalization	   of	   the	   RMB,	   Capital	   Market	   Openness,	   and	   Financial	  
Reforms	  in	  China,	  NBER	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  20943,	  February	  2015.	  
4	   The	   ASEAN	   members	   are	   Brunei,	   Cambodia,	   Indonesia,	   Laos,	   Malaysia,	   Myanmar,	   Philippines,	  
Singapore,	  Thailand,	  Vietnam.	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major	   challenges	   will	   therefore	   consist	   in	   defusing	   the	   destabilising	   security	  
competition	  between	  China	  and	  major	  neighbouring	  countries,	  notably	  Japan,	  India	  
and	  Vietnam,	  avoiding	  the	  “Findlandisation”	  of	  East	  and	  Central	  Asia	  and	  averting	  a	  
lethal	  confrontation	  between	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  	  
Globally,	  the	  United	  States	  capacity	  to	   lead	   is	  now	  diminished	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  
be	  so	  over	  the	  medium	  term.	  The	  United	  States	  economic	  strength,	  a	  key	  factor	  for	  
its	  global	  prestige	  and	  influence,	  was	  critically	  eroded	  by	  the	  last	  financial	  crisis	  and	  
its	   massive	   budget	   deficits.	   Its	   moral	   standing	   was	   damaged	   by	   its	   military	  
expeditions	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq.	  And	  the	  gridlocked	  Washington	  is	  undermining	  
the	   U.S.	   credibility	   as	   a	   reliable	   partner,	   the	   trenchant	   polarization	   of	   its	   polity	  
leading	   to	   paralysis	   in	   decisions,	   unfulfilled	   international	   commitments	   and	   the	  
inability	   to	   carry	   consistent	   strategies	   and	   their	   implementation	   across	   multiple	  
political	   cycles.	   Although	  none	  of	   the	   rising	   powers	   is	   capable	   of	   exercising	   global	  
leadership	   in	   the	   foreseeable	   future,	   China’s	   rising	   economic	   power	   and	   assertive	  
foreign	   policies	   will	   irremediably	   spur	   the	   fraying	   of	   long	   standing	   Western	   and	  
other	   institutional	   and	   informal	   alliances	   and	   a	   reconfiguration	   of	   spheres	   of	  
influence.	  
	  
With	  success	  come	  responsibilities	  
The	  rising	  share	  of	  East	  Asia	  economies	   in	  total	  world	  exports	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  
defining	  features	  of	  the	  global	  economy	  in	  recent	  decades.	  Starting	  with	  Japan	  in	  the	  
1970s,	  it	  is	  undeniable	  that	  the	  substantial	  increases	  in	  economic	  growth	  and	  human	  
welfare	   achieved	   by	   many	   Asian	   economies	   is	   tributary	   to	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   that	  
governs	   the	   liberal	   investment,	   trade	   and	   monetary	   international	   regime	  
implemented	  by	  Western	  countries	  under	  U.S.	  leadership.	  The	  accession	  of	  China	  to	  
the	   World	   Trade	   Organization	   in	   2001	   not	   only	   facilitated	   access	   to	   the	   large	  
European	   and	   North	   American	   markets	   but	   was	   used	   by	   Chinese	   leaders	   to	  
legitimate	  many	  domestic	  reforms.	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A	  major	  step	  in	  aligning	  the	  global	  governance	  architecture	  to	  the	  significant	  shift	  in	  
the	   center	   of	   gravity	   of	   global	   economic	   power	   was	   taken	   in	   2008	   with	   the	  
formation	   of	   the	  Group	  of	   Twenty	   (G20).	   Five	  Asian	   countries	   are	  member	   of	   the	  
G20	   which	   purports	   to	   be	   a	   “premier	   forum	   for	   our	   international	   economic	  
cooperation.”5	  At	  the	  outset,	  the	  G20	  was	   instrumental	   in	  ensuring	  that	  the	  global	  
financial	  crisis	  did	  not	  cause	  a	  second	  Great	  Depression.	   It	   injected	  unprecedented	  
liquidity	   into	   the	   world	   economy	   through	   coordinated	   national	   actions,	   including	  
some	  $5	   trillion	   in	   stimulus	  at	   the	  London	  Summit	  of	  April	  2009.	   It	   reaffirmed	   the	  
International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  surveillance	  role	  and	  its	  
function	  of	   international	   lender	  of	   last	   resort,	   created	   the	  Financial	  Stability	  Board	  
with	   a	   mandate	   to	   develop	   new	   regulatory	   standards	   for	   systemically	   important	  
financial	  institutions,	  and	  insisted	  on	  new	  bank	  capital	  account	  requirements	  under	  
the	   Basel	   III	   agreement.	   Its	   members	   agreed	   to	   “standstill”	   provisions	   to	   avoid	   a	  
recurrence	   of	   the	   ruinous	   beggar-­‐thy-­‐neighbor	   policies	   of	   the	   1930s.	   The	   changes	  
agreed	   in	   November	   2010	   at	   the	   Seoul	   Summit	   to	   double	   the	   IMF	   resources	   and	  
better	   reflect	   in	   its	   governance	   structure	  and	   that	  of	   the	  World	  Bank	   the	   relative	  
weight	   of	   members	   in	   the	   world	   economy	   aim	   at	   giving	   China	   and	   India,	   in	  
particular,	  a	  more	  authoritative	  voice	  in	  the	  setting	  of	  policy	  directions.	  
China	  has	   to	  varying	  degrees	  upheld,	  accepted	  or	  adapted	   to	  prevailing	   structures	  
and	  norms	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  except	  when	  they	  clash	  with	  its	  Westphalian	  
conception	  of	  the	  world,	  or	  might	  create	  serious	  problems	  domestically.	  China	  has	  
maintained	  a	  low	  profile	  in	  global	  governance	  and	  appears	  to	  have	  limited	  interest	  
in	  assuming	  a	  leadership	  role.	  In	  international	  forums,	  it	  remains	  hesitant	  to	  join	  the	  
club	   of	   "donors"	   and	   ambivalent	   in	   assuming	   responsibilities	   for	   the	   provision	   of	  
international	  public	  goods.	  On	  balance	  however,	  China	  has	  deepened	  and	  expanded	  
its	   formal	   commitments	   to	  many	   international	   norms,	   especially	   in	   areas	   such	   as	  
trade,	   nuclear	   non-­‐proliferation	   and	   the	   management	   of	   non-­‐traditional	   security	  
                                                
5	  Leaders’	  declaration	  at	  the	  Pittsburgh	  G20	  meeting,	  2009.	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threats	  such	  as	  pandemics.	  Its	  role	  in	  the	  Six	  Party	  Talks	  on	  the	  nuclear	  ambitions	  of	  
North	  Korea,	  its	  participation	  in	  the	  P5+1,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  Joint	  Comprehensive	  Plan	  
of	   Action	   framework	   agreement	   regarding	   Iran’s	   nuclear	   program,	   and	   the	  
engagement	  of	  the	  Chinese	  navy	  in	  joint	  anti-­‐piracy	  operations	  with	  NATO	  navies	  in	  
the	  Gulf	  of	  Aden	  and	  the	  coast	  of	  Africa	  shows	  that	  China	  is	  not	  allergic	  to	  collective	  
action	  when	  congruent	  with	  its	  broad	  interests.	  Its	  substantial	  financial	  contribution	  
and	   deployment	   of	   medical	   personnel	   in	   Western	   Africa	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   Ebola	  
epidemic	  may	  portent	  a	  growing	  engagement	  in	  world	  affairs.	  
Since	  2011,	   the	  momentum	   for	   significant	   reforms	  of	  major	   international	   financial	  
institutions	   has	   evaporated.	   Sure,	   the	  G7	  was	   an	   anachronism	  but	   the	  G20	   is	   too	  
large,	  victim	  of	  its	  heterogeneous	  composition	  and	  the	  unwillingness	  of	  established	  
members	  to	  alter	  their	  standing	  within	  the	  governance	  structures.	  The	  reform	  of	  the	  
IMF	   to	  which	   the	  U.S.	  Administration	   signed-­‐off	   in	   2010	   remains	   stalled,	   victim	  of	  
the	  U.S.	  Congress	  failure	  to	  adopt	  the	  enabling	  legislation.	  Changes	  to	  the	  “political”	  
world	   governance	   institutions	   are	   prisoners	   of	   a	   similar	   status	   protective	   vise.	  
Membership	  of	  the	  International	  Energy	  Agency	  (IEA)	   is	   limited	  to	  OECD	  members.	  
The	  conspicuous	  absence	  of	  China,	  India	  and	  Indonesia,	  despite	  their	  huge	  imports	  
of	   hydrocarbons,	   weakens	   the	   capacity	   of	   this	  multilateral	   institution	   to	   facilitate	  
cooperation	   between	   energy-­‐consuming	   countries.	   In	   its	   own	   backyard,	   Japan’s	  
voting	   share	   of	   the	   Asian	   Development	   Bank	   ("ADB")	   is	   more	   than	   twice	   that	   of	  
China	   and	   the	   bank’s	   president	   has	   always	   been	   Japanese.	   More	   broadly,	   it	   is	  
accepted	  that	  institutions	  like	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  are	  in	  need	  of	  reform	  if	  they	  
are	   to	   retain	   their	   credibility.	   Demands	   by	   India	   and	   Japan	   for	   a	   permanent	  
membership	  on	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  have	  been	  actively	  opposed	  by	  China	  which	  
is	   in	  a	  position	   to	   smoother	  proposals	   to	  change	   the	  composition	  and	  workings	  of	  
this	  premier	  organ	  of	  world	  governance	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  status	  on	  the	  Council.	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A	  polycentric	  geopolitical	  landscape	  
History	   teaches	   that	   polities	   seek	   power	   and	   status	   commensurate	   with	   their	  
wealth.	   Increasing	   military	   expenditures,	   conflicting	   territorial	   and	   maritime	  
disputes	  coupled	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  five	  of	  the	  eight	  declared	  nuclear	  states	  are	   in	  or	  
border	  Asia	   are	   affecting	   regional	   security	   dynamics.	   The	  presence	  of	   three	  major	  
Asian	  powers	  which	  actively	  compete	  with	  each	  other	  for	   influence	  and	  leadership	  
in	   the	   region	   is	   fraught	   with	   risks,	   especially	   since	   their	   population	   still	   harbor	  
resentment	  between	  each	  other.	  Whether	  the	  competition	  between	  China	  and	  the	  
United	  States	  for	  regional	  influence	  can	  be	  managed	  peacefully	  will	  remain	  a	  source	  
of	   concern.	   This	   general	   state	   of	   affairs	   renders	   the	   continued	   pursuit	   of	   a	   stable	  
balance	  of	  power	  an	  absolute	  priority	  for	  Asian	  countries.	  	  
The	   rise	   of	   China	   as	   a	   global	   economic	   engine	   is	   bound	   to	   give	   rise	   to	   profound	  
geopolitical	   consequences.	   In	   the	   region,	   China	   has	   become	   the	   largest	   trading	  
partner	  for	  ASEAN,	  India,	  Japan	  and	  South	  Korea	  displacing	  the	  United	  States	  which,	  
heretofore,	  enjoyed	   that	  position	  and	   the	   influence	   that	  attaches.	  Asians	  view	   the	  
United	  States	  as	  the	  only	  power	  that	  can	  contain	  China,	  but	  no	  Asian	  country	  wants	  
to	  be	  forced	  to	  choose	  side	  for	  fear	  of	  jeopardizing	  the	  benefits	  accruing	  from	  their	  
close	  economic	   ties	  with	  China.	  The	   frangibility	  of	   the	  allegiances	   is	  not	   limited	   to	  
Asian	   countries.	   In	   the	  Middle	   East,	   Saudi	   Arabia	   has	   initiated	   a	   pivot	   to	   Asia,	   an	  
economically	  rational	  policy	  now	  that	  it	  sells	  more	  than	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  its	  oil	  in	  South	  
and	  East	  Asia	  markets	  and	  that	  North	  America	  is	  poised	  to	  become	  a	  net	  exporter.	  	  
The	   European	   Union	   is	   also	   vulnerable	   to	   deepening	   geostrategic	   cleavages. 
Germany’s	   foreign	   policy	   has	   unmistakingly	   edged	   towards	   a	   rapprochement	  with	  
China.	  Since	  2011,	  the	  two	  countries	  have	  held	  annual	  joint	  Cabinet	  meetings,	  a	  first	  
for	  China.	  Given	  Germany’s	  ascendency	  within	  Continental	  Europe,	  particularly	  vis-­‐à-­‐
vis	  central	  and	  eastern	  European	  members,	  this	  rapprochement	  is	  bound	  to	  imprint	  
a	   tighter	  alignment	  between	  China	  and	   the	  European	  Union	   foreign	  policies	  which	  
could	  pose	  problems.	  Henry	  Kissinger’s	  warning,	  albeit	  in	  other	  circumstances,	  that	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Germany	   will	   "avoid	   controversy	   outside	   of	   Europe,	   even	   when	   they	   affected	  
fundamental	  security	  interests"	  with	  all	  the	  consequent	  reverberations	  on	  European	  
unity	   and	   the	   undermining	   effects	   on	   U.S.	   leadership,	   remains	   apt.	   For	   instance,	  
what	   attitude	  would	  Germany	   adopt	   should	   an	  Asian	   version	   of	   an	   occupation	   or	  
annexation	  "à	  la	  Crimea"	  occur?	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	  Ostpolitik	   between	  Germany	   and	  Russia	   (and	   similarly	  with	  
Italy)	   is	   not	   shared	  by	   the	   countries	   on	   its	   periphery	   and	   is	   viewed	  with	   alarm	  by	  
Poland	  and	  Baltic	  members.	  To	  be	  fair,	  Chancellor	  Merkel	  demonstrated	  outstanding	  
leadership	  in	  her	  own	  country	  and	  at	  the	  European	  level	  in	  her	  response	  to	  Russia’s	  
annexation	   of	   Crimea	   despite	   significant	   opposition	   from	   influential	   Germans,	  
including	  former	  Chancellor	  Gerhard	  Schroeder	  and	  former	  President	  Roman	  Herzog	  
and	   the	  German	  business	   community.	  Notwithstanding	   the	  alignment	  of	  Germany	  
with	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  Ukraine	  crisis,	  it	  remains	  that	  the	  Westbindung	  is	  now	  
a	  choice	  that	  German	  leaders	  may	  not	  pursue	  with	  the	  same	  vigor	   in	  the	  future	  as	  
they	  contend	  with	  a	  fragmented	  public	  opinion	  on	  the	  role	  of	  Germany	  in	  European	  
and	  international	  political	  and	  security	  affairs.	  How	  will	  Germany,	  and	  it	  follows,	  the	  
European	  Union,	  calibrate	  its	  foreign	  policy	  between	  Russia	  and	  China	  since	  the	  two	  
countries	   compete	   fiercely	   in	  Central	  Asia	   to	  establish	  or	  maintain	   their	   sphere	  of	  
influence?	  	  
At	  the	  APEC	  Summit	  in	  October	  2014,	  President	  Xi	  Jinping’s	  proposed	  the	  creation	  of	  
the	   Asian	   Infrastructure	   Investment	   Bank	   (AIIB),	   a	   multilateral	   development	   bank	  
with	   the	  mandate	   to	  provide	   infrastructure	   investment	   loans	   to	   its	  Asian	  partners,	  
and	  invited	  countries	  to	  join,	  before	  March	  31st,	  2015,	  as	  "founding	  members".6	  
AIIB’s	   stated	  mission	   to	   fund	   infrastructure	   has	   endeared	   the	   initiative	  with	  Asian	  
countries	   which	   view	   it	   as	   a	   welcomed	   addition	   to	   the	   existing	   multilateral	  
                                                
6	   In	   addition	   to	   China,	   the	   initial	   round	   of	   founding	  members	   is	   comprised	   of	   Bangladesh,	   Brunei,	  
Cambodia,	   India,	   Kazakhstan,	   Kuwait,	   Laos,	  Malaysia,	  Mongolia,	  Myanmar,	   Nepal,	   Oman,	   Pakistan,	  
Philippines,	  Qatar,	  Singapore,	  Sri	  Lanka,	  Thailand,	  Uzbekistan	  and	  Vietnam.	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institutions	  which	  lack	  the	  resources	  to	  fill	  Asia’s	  massive	  infrastructure	  funding	  gap	  
estimated	  by	  the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank	  ("ADB")	  at	  some	  $8	  trillion	  between	  2010	  
and	  2020.	  The	  AIIB	  initiative	  has	  set	  off	  a	  heated	  diplomatic	  battle	  with	  the	  United	  
States	  which	  has	  actively	   lobbied	  allies	  not	   to	  accept	  China’s	   invitation	   to	  become	  
founding	   members.	   Despite	   the	   overt	   efforts	   of	   the	   Obama	   Administration,	  
Australia,	   India	   and	   South	   Korea	   and	   also	   two	   of	   China’s	   recent	   antagonistic	  
neighbours	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   South	   China	   Sea	   claims	   –	   Vietnam	   and	   the	  
Philippines	  –	  signed	  up	  as	  founding	  members.	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  followed	  with	  its	  
March	  2015	  announcement	  that	  it	  was	  joining	  as	  a	  founding	  member.	  This	  decision	  
by	  an	  European	  ally	  was	  prompted,	  in	  part,	  by	  Britain’s	  drive	  to	  establish	  the	  City	  of	  
London	   as	   the	   world’s	   largest	   international	   exchange	   center	   for	   the	   Yuan.	   The	  
United	  Kingdom	   is	  also	   the	   largest	   recipient	  of	  Chinese	   investment	   in	  Europe.	  The	  
British	  decision	   to	   join	  was	  quickly	   followed	  by	   that	  of	   France,	  Germany	  and	   Italy.	  
Whether	   the	   AIIB,	   the	   World	   Bank	   and	   the	   ADB	   will	   be	   competing	   or	   partner	  
institutions	  is	  a	  legitimate	  question	  but,	  underneath,	  lies	  the	  deeper	  concern	  of	  the	  
United	  States	  and	  Japan	  that	  China	  will	  use	  the	  new	  bank	  to	  expand	  its	  influence	  at	  
their	  expense.	  The	  whole	  episode	  is	  a	  diplomatic	  defeat	  for	  the	  United	  States	  which	  
will	  be	  seen	  in	  many	  quarters	  as	  another	  manifestation	  of	  its	  waning	  power.7	  	  
The	  obvious	  conclusion	  is	  that	  the	  "degrees	  of	  freedom"	  enjoyed	  heretofore	  by	  the	  
United	  States	  in	  global	  affairs	  are	  being	  significantly	  curtailed	  and	  the	  window	  may	  
well	   be	   closing	   more	   rapidly	   than	   presently	   foreseen.	   The	   statecraft	   needed	   to	  
navigate	  successfully	  through	  this	  uncharted	  geopolitical	  environment	  remains	  work	  
in	  progress,	  a	  task	  incumbent	  not	  solely	  on	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States	  but	  also	  for	  
all	  other	  major	  economies.	  
	   	  
                                                
7	  Canada	  missed	  the	  deadline	  of	  March	  2015	  to	  sign	  on	  as	  a	  founding	  member.	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The	  changing	  nature	  of	  international	  business	  competition	  
The	  rapid	  growth	  of	  exports	   from	  Asia	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	  structural	  shift	   in	   its	  
composition,	   from	   primary	   commodities	   to	   manufacturing,	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	  
success	  of	   these	  economies	   to	   integrate	  and	   structure	   the	  extensive	  global	   supply	  
chains	   that	  account	   for	  more	   than	  35%	  of	   total	   trade	   in	  manufactured	  goods.	  The	  
competitiveness	   of	   the	   Asian	   manufacturing	   stems	   from	   its	   specialization	   in	  
electronic,	  electrical	  goods	  and	  automotive	  industries	  and	  the	  tight	  fit	  of	   its	  supply	  
chain	   networks	   between	   regional	   and	   global	   integration.	   Today,	   5	   of	   the	   top	   15	  
manufacturers	   by	   share	   of	   global	   nominal	   manufacturing	   gross	   value	   added	   are	  
Asian	  countries.8	  
Intra-­‐Asia	   trade	   is	   skewed	   towards	   parts	   and	   intermediate	   products	  within	   supply	  
chain	   networks.	   Its	   composition	   reflects	   a	   specialization	   across	   the	   region	   where	  
Japan	  and	  South	  Korea	  provide	   the	  high	   technology	  components,	  other	  East	  Asian	  
economies	   supply	  parts	   and	   components	   and	  China	   is	   the	   leading	   center	   for	   their	  
final	   assembly.	   Hence,	   the	   nature	   of	   trade	   within	   Asia	   differs	   from	   its	   exports	   to	  
Europe	   and	   North	   America	   which	   are	   dominated	   by	   final	   goods.	   Vertical	   trade	  
involves	  the	  import	  of	  intermediate	  goods.	  When	  domestic	  firms	  engage	  in	  vertical	  
trade,	   a	   certain	   volume	   of	  more	   complete	   or	   final	   goods	  will	   return	   to	   the	   home	  
country.	   Tariffs	   on	   such	   imports	   act	   as	   impediments	   to	   their	   expansion	   abroad.	  
Moreover,	  there	  exists	  a	  strong	  complementary	  relationship	  between	  vertical	  trade	  
and	   foreign	   direct	   investments	   ("FDI").	   Consequently,	   barriers	   to	   FDI	   between	  
countries	   become	   as	   important	   as	   bilateral	   trade	   restrictions	   and,	   therefore,	  
liberalization	  of	  both	  activities	   is	  needed	  to	  partake	   into	  vertical	  trade	  networks.	  A	  
telling	  example	  –	  the	  Apple	  iPhone	  –	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Table	  1.	  
	  
                                                
8	  These	  countries,	  and	  their	  ranking,	  are:	  China	  (2),	  Japan	  (3),	  South	  Korea	  (7),	  India	  (10),	  Indonesia	  
(13).	  The	  United	  States	  is	  first	  and	  Canada	  holds	  the	  fifteen	  rank.	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Table	  1.	  




The	  trade	  agenda	  
The	   remarkable	   success	   of	   East	   and	   Southeast	   Asia	   in	   global	   manufacturing	   was	  
made	  possible	  by	  policies	  enticing	  foreign	  direct	  investments	  –	  notably	  by	  Japanese,	  
South	  Korean,	  American	  and	  European	  corporations	   -­‐	  which	  are	  drivers	  of	   vertical	  
trade	  and	  the	  gradual	  knitting	  of	  a	  complex	  web	  of	  bilateral	  and	  regional	  free	  trade	  
agreements	   (FTA)	   to	  ensure	  that	   the	   fragmentation	  of	  production	  across	  countries	  
within	  an	  industry	  supply	  chain	  was	  not	  hindered.	  According	  to	  the	  ADB,	  there	  are	  
close	  to	  250	  FTAs	  involving	  Asian	  countries	  that	  have	  been	  concluded	  or	  are	  under	  
negotiation.9	  ASEAN	  has	  emerged	  as	  the	  nexus	  of	  the	  network	  of	  FTAs	  that	  link	  Asia.	  
About	  55	  percent	  of	  Asia’s	  trade	  is	  conducted	  among	  Asian	  economies.	  
                                                
9	  Asia	  Regional	  Integration	  Center	  (ARIC)	  website,	  http://aric.abd.org/	  	  
Note:	  The	  costs	  and	  prices	  are	  for	  the	  iPhone4S	  (16GB)	  in	  2011.	  The	  retail	  price	  is	  SIM-­‐free	  and	  without	  contracts. 
Source:	  Shirakawa	  M.,	  "Japan-­‐US	  Economic	  Relations:	  What	  we	  can	  learn	  from	  each	  other",	  Bank	  of	  Japan,	  April	  2012	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Paradoxically,	   the	   major	   casualty	   from	   the	   rise	   of	   emerging	   economies	   has	   been	  
multilateral	  trade	  liberalization.	  The	  stance	  adopted	  by	  the	  major	  emerging	  market	  
economies,	   notably	  Brazil,	   China	  and	   India,	   during	   the	  Doha	  Round	  of	  multilateral	  
trade	  negotiations	  which	  started	  in	  November	  2001,	  have	  not	  only	  played	  a	  part	  in	  
the	  historic	  failure	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement	  but	  comforted	  many	  leaders	  in	  developed	  
economies	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  WTO	  multilateral	  approach	  was	  lopsided	  and	  that	  it	  
no	   longer	  served	  their	   interests.	  And	  why	  should	  Western	  economies	  promote	  the	  
economic	  interdependence	  that	  sustains	  overall	  growth	  but	  simultaneously	  produce	  
geopolitical	   rivals?	   The	   response	   to	   this	   contemporary	   policy	   dilemma	  has	   been	   a	  
systematic	  drive	  by	  major	  industrialized	  economies	  to	  eschew	  the	  WTO	  multilateral	  
regime	  in	  favour	  of	  bilateral	  and	  regional	  free	  trade	  agreements.	  The	  United	  States	  
has	   been	   particularly	   active	   on	   this	   front	   which,	   in	   turn,	   spurred	   a	   stampede	   by	  
other	  countries	  to	  reach	  similar	  agreements	   in	  order	  to	   immunize	  their	  economies	  
from	  the	  cost	  of	  trade	  diversion	  that	  was	  bound	  to	  ensue.	  
FTAs	   are	   not	   only	   instruments	   for	   economic	   integration	   but	   also	   a	   means	   to	  
structure	   international	   relations.	   Launched	   in	   2010,	   the	   U.S.	   led	   Trans	   Pacific	  
Partnership	  ("TPP")	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point.10	  It	  now	  encompasses	  twelve	  countries	  which,	  
combined,	  produce	  40	  percent	  of	  global	  GDP.11	  The	  U.S.	  "partners"	  account	  for	  45	  
percent	  of	  U.S.	  exports	  and	  37	  percent	  of	  U.S.	  imports.	  However,	  there	  is	  much	  less	  
than	   meets	   the	   eye:	   75	   percent	   of	   this	   trade	   is	   already	   conducted	   within	   the	  
confines	  of	  the	  FTAs	  six	  of	  the	  11	  other	  nations	  already	  have	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  
The	  defining	  aspect	  of	  the	  TPP	  is	  that	  China	  and	  Indonesia	  are	  absent	  from	  the	  table.	  
The	   first	   is	   the	   largest	   trading	   partner	   of	  most	   Asia-­‐Pacific	   countries	  whereas	   the	  
second	  has	  been	  the	  leading	  force	  of	  ASEAN	  throughout	  its	  history.	  Their	  exclusion	  
                                                
10	  Its	  antecedent	  is	  the	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Strategic	  Economic	  Partnership	  concluded	  in	  2005	  by	  Singapore,	  
Brunei,	   Chile	   and	   New	   Zealand.	   The	   United	   States	   used	   this	   FTA	   as	   a	   building	   block	   for	   its	   TPP	  
proposal.	  
11	  The	  twelve	  countries	  engaged	  in	  the	  TPP	  negotiations	  are:	  Australia,	  Brunei,	  Canada,	  Chile,	  Japan,	  
Malaysia,	   Mexico,	   New	   Zealand,	   Peru,	   Singapore,	   the	   United	   States,	   and	   Vietnam.	   Only	   4	   are	  
members	  of	  ASEAN.	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has	  painted	  the	  U.S.	  initiative	  as	  a	  means	  to	  contain	  Chinese	  influence	  in	  the	  region	  
and	   a	   tool	   to	   exert	   additional	   leverage	   in	   its	   dealings	   with	   China,	   a	   suspicion	  
reinforced	   when	   Japan	   joined	   the	   negotiations	   in	   2013.	   U.S.	   Defence	   Secretary	  
Ashton	  Carter’s	  comment	  that	  TPP	  is	  the	  economic	  complement	  to	  the	  U.S.	  military	  
rebalance	  to	  Asia	  and	  as	  important	  as	  "another	  aircraft	  carrier"	  does	  not	  suffer	  from	  
a	   profusion	   of	   ambiguity.	   	   From	   Indonesia’s	   perspective,	   TPP	   is	   seen	   as	   a	   clumsy	  
attempt	  on	  the	  part	  of	   the	  United	  States	  to	  take	  the	   leadership	  of	  South	  East	  Asia	  
trade	   and	   foreign	   investment	   agenda	   and,	   consequently,	   threaten	   the	   balance	   of	  
power	   ASEAN	   as	   assiduously	   sought	   to	   achieve	   since	   its	   inception.	   There	   are	   also	  
concerns	   that	   a	   successful	   conclusion	   of	   the	   TPP	   negotiations	   would	   give	   rise	   to	  
centrifugal	   forces	   that	   would	   disrupt	   the	   current	   trade	   patterns	   within	   Asia.	   The	  
response	   to	   the	   U.S.	   led	   TPP	   took	   the	   form	   of	   ASEAN’s	   Regional	   Comprehensive	  
Economic	  Partnership	  ("RCEP")	  which	  has	  gathered	  China’s	  active	  support	  from	  the	  
outset.	   The	  RCEP	   involves	   all	   ASEAN	  members	   and	   the	   six	   FTA	  partners,	   including	  
Japan,	  South	  Korea	  and	  India,	  but	  excludes	  the	  United	  States.12	  While	  the	  RCEP	  and	  
TPP	   are	   generally	   considered	   as	   competing	   schemes,	   both	   China	   and	   the	   United	  
States	  have	  downplayed	  the	  rivalry.	  	  
The	  RCEP	  and	  the	  TPP	  represent	   two	  different	  models	  and	  approaches	   to	   regional	  
economic	  integration	  in	  the	  Asia	  Pacific	  region.13	  The	  dynamics	  within	  the	  RCEP	  and	  
the	  TPP	  are	  also	  quite	  different.	   Led	  by	   the	  United	  States,	   the	  TPP	   is	   labelled	  as	  a	  
group	   of	   "like-­‐minded"	   countries	   seeking	   to	   achieve	   a	   high-­‐standard	   and	  
comprehensive	   FTA	   in	   order	   to	   correct	   the	   weaknesses	   in	   existing	   regional	  
agreements.	   The	   approach	   is	   rules-­‐based.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   China	   led	   RCEP	   "seeks	  
harmony	   but	   not	   uniformity".	   The	   primary	   goal	   is	   to	   multilateralise	   the	   regional	  
                                                
12	   The	   countries	   participating	   the	   the	   RCEP	   negotiations	   are	   the	   ten	   ASEAN	   members	   (Brunei,	  
Cambodia,	   Indonesia,	   Laos,	  Malaysia,	  Myanmar,	   the	  Philippines,	   Singapore,	  Thailand,	  Vietnam)	  and	  
the	   six	   states	  with	  which	  ASEAN	  has	   existing	   FTAs	   (Australia,	   China,	   India,	   Japan,	   South	   Korea	   and	  
New	  Zealand).	  RCEP	  negotiations	  were	  formally	  launched	  in	  November	  2012	  at	  the	  ASEAN	  Summit	  in	  
Cambodia.	  
13	  Wilson,	   Jeffery	  D.,	  Mega-­‐Regional	  Trade	  Deals	   in	   the	  Asia-­‐Pacific:	  Choosing	  between	  the	  TPP	  and	  
the	  RCEP?	  45	  (2)	  Journal	  of	  Contemporary	  Asia	  345,	  2015.	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trade	   system	   by	   combining	   the	   overlapping	   ASEAN-­‐plus	   FTAs	   into	   a	   single	  
agreement.	   This	   objective	   is	   also	   in	   line	   with	   ASEAN’s	   efforts	   to	   implement	   the	  
ASEAN	   Economic	   Community	   ("AEC").	   The	   pressure	   of	   non-­‐ASEAN	   countries	   to	  
conclude	  the	  RCEP	  may	   indeed	  quickened	  the	  pace	  of	  ASEAN’s	  own	  economic	  and	  
political	  integration,	  a	  favorable	  outcome,	  if	  any.	  
From	   a	  wealth	   creating	   point	   of	   view,	   the	   results	   of	   recent	   studies	   conclude	   that	  
although	  the	  RCEP	  is	  a	  less	  ambitious	  trade	  architecture	  than	  the	  TPP,	  if	  successfully	  
concluded,	  it	  would	  generate	  annual	  benefits	  of	  0.6	  percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  2025,	  larger	  
than	   the	  0.2	  percent	  of	  GDP	  TPP	  would	   yield.	   This	   is	   because	   the	  RCEP	  addresses	  
larger	   pre-­‐existing	   trade	   barriers,	   principally	   among	   China,	   India,	   Japan	   and	   South	  
Korea.14	   Notwithstanding	   these	   substantial	   recurring	   benefits,	   their	   successful	  
conclusion	  is	  not	  a	  foregone	  conclusion.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  RCEP,	  significant	  development	  
gaps	  among	  RCEP	  members,	   the	   lack	  of	   commonality	  across	  ASEAN	  plus	  one	  FTAs	  
and	  varying	  domestic	  policies,	  the	  lack	  of	  domestic	  support,	  and	  concurrent	  regional	  
integration	  agendas,	  constitute	  difficulties	  that	  may	  be	  hard	  to	  overcome.15	  The	  TPP	  
is	   confronted	   with	   the	   intractable	   roadblocks	   to	   the	   liberalisation	   of	   trade	   in	  
agricultural	  products.	  Although	  the	  relevant	  U.S.	  House	  and	  Senate	  committees	  have	  
passed	   the	  Trade	  Promotion	  Authority	   legislation	   in	  mid-­‐April	  2015,	   there	   remains	  
strong	  opposition	  to	  "fast	  track"	  the	  TPP	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Congress.	  	  Should	  Congress	  fail	  
to	  adopt	  this	  legislation,	  the	  negative	  consequences	  for	  the	  United	  States	  would	  be	  
severe	  and	  long-­‐lasting.16	  
China	  is	  not	  indifferent	  to	  the	  U.S.	  trade	  strategy.	  In	  April	  2008,	  China	  signed	  a	  free	  
trade	   agreement	   with	   New	   Zealand,	   the	   first	   with	   any	   developed	   country.17	   In	  
November	  2014,	  it	  concluded	  a	  free	  trade	  agreement	  with	  Australia	  and	  announced	  
                                                
14	  "State	  of	  the	  Region	  2014-­‐2015",	  Pacific	  Economic	  Cooperation	  Council,	  2014.	  
15	   Sanchita	   Basu	  Das,	  Challenges	   in	  Negotiating	   the	   Regional	   Comprehensive	   Economic	   Partnership	  
Agreement,	  ISEAS	  Perspective	  No.	  47,	  August	  2013.	  
16	   Altman,	   Roger	   C.,	   Richard	  N.	   Hass,	  Why	   the	   Asian	   Trade	  Deal	  Matters,	   New	   York	   Times,	   4	   April	  
2015.	  
17	  New	  Zealand’s	  exports	  to	  China	  increased	  from	  $	  4	  billion	  in	  2010	  to	  $11	  billion	  in	  2014.	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that	  it	  had	  "effectively"	  reached	  a	  free	  trade	  agreement	  with	  South	  Korea.	  All	  three	  
Asia-­‐Pacific	   countries	   have	   a	   bilateral	   trade	   agreement	   with	   the	   United	   States.	  
President	   Xi	   Jinping	  push	   at	   the	  November	   2014	  APEC	   Summit	   for	   the	   Free	   Trade	  
Area	   of	   the	   Asia	   Pacific	   (FTAAP)	   is	   widely	   considered	   as	   a	   cunning	   initiative	   to	  
relegate	   the	   U.S.	   led	   Trans	   Pacific	   Partnership	   (TPP)	   to	   a	   subsidiary	   platform.	   It	  
should	   also	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   clever	   way	   to	   signal	   China’s	   willingness	   to	   engage	   in	  
discussions	  with	   the	  United	  States	  concerning	  a	   free	   trade	  agreement	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
defensive	   move	   to	   counter	   the	   trade	   diversion	   cost	   that	   will	   accrue	   from	   the	  
implementation	  of	   the	  EU-­‐USA	  Transatlantic	   Trade	  and	   Investment	  Partnership.	   In	  
the	  years	  following	  the	  2003	  conclusion	  of	  the	  Comprehensive	  Strategic	  Partnership	  
between	   China	   and	   the	   EU,	   the	   EU	   has	   become	   China’s	   largest	   trading	   partner.	  
Hence,	   the	  potential	   for	   trade	  diversion	  at	   the	  expense	  of	  China	  stemming	   from	  a	  
EU-­‐US	  trade	  agreement	  is	  not	  inconsequential.	  
	  
Industrial	  competition	  
On	  account	  of	  their	  size	  and	  rapid	  per	  capita	  GDP	  growth,	  China,	  India	  and	  Indonesia	  
have	  become	  very	  large	  markets	  in	  a	  growing	  list	  of	  consumer	  and	  industrial	  goods.	  
Taking	  advantage	  of	  these	  favorable	  circumstances,	  many	  Chinese	  and	  Indian	  firms	  
have	   reached	   size	   and	   productivity	   levels	   comparable	   to	   that	   of	   the	   largest	  
multinational	  companies	  that,	  heretofore,	  dominated	  their	  industry.18	  They	  are	  also	  
growing	  at	  a	  much	  faster	  pace,	  despite	  the	  fierce	  competition	  that	  generally	  prevails	  
in	  these	  large	  markets.	  A	  comparison	  of	  the	  concentration	  ratios	  in	  the	  Chinese	  and	  
American	   manufacturing	   industries	   found	   that	   China	   has	   sharply	   lower	  
concentration	   ratios	   suggesting	   that	   "markets	   for	   Chinese	  manufactured	   products	  
                                                
18	   In	   the	   mechanical	   engineering	   sector,	   Shanghai	   Electric	   Group	   (electrical	   equipment),	   Beijing	  
Jingcheng	  Machinery	   (mechanical	   equipment),	   Gree	   Electric	   Appliances	   (HVAC	   equipment),	   Harbin	  
Power	  Equipment	  (power	  systems)	  and	  Shanghai	  Zhenhua	  Heavy	  Industries	  (material	  handling),	  each	  
have	  annual	  revenues	  exceeding	  $20	  billion.	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are	   considerably	  more	   competitive	   than	   the	  U.S."19	   The	   suggestion	   that	   Asian	   ITC	  
companies	  will	  do	  far	  better	  outside	  their	  borders	  than	  their	  Western	  counterparts	  
will	  do	  in	  their	  domestic	  market,	  not	  because	  of	  regulations	  but	  for	  cultural	  reasons,	  
may	  prove	  accurate.20	  The	  huge	  success	  of	  Alibaba,	  an	  internet	  retailer,	  is	  a	  case	  in	  
point.	  However,	  that	  may	  not	  be	  the	  case	  in	  other	  sectors	  since	  their	  global	  footprint	  
and	  influence	  is	  shallow.	  The	  distinction	  between	  "made-­‐in-­‐China"	  where	  domestic	  
and	   foreign-­‐owned	   establishments	   supply	   or	   assembled	   products	   for	   the	   world’s	  
largest	  established	  brands	  and	  retailer’s	  private	  labels	  and	  "made-­‐by-­‐China"	  reflects	  
huge	  differences	  in	  industrial	  capabilities.	  
It	   is	  well	  established	   in	  the	  academic	   literature	  that	  home	  demand	  determines	  the	  
pattern	   of	   specialization	   and	   the	   level	   of	   quality	   of	   export	   products.21	   The	   large	  
Asian	   emerging	   markets	   are	   dominated	   by	   high	   volume,	   low	   cost	   products.	  
Consequently,	   the	   level	   of	   price	   competition	   in	   many	   industries	   will	   increase	  
considerably	   with	   the	   business	   imperatives	   that	   ensue. Yingli	   solar	   panels	   and	  
Xiomi’s	   "good	   enough",	   well-­‐designed,	   reasonably	   priced	   "Mi"	   smart	   phones	   are	  
harbingers	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  competition	  Western	  firms	  will	  increasingly	  encounter	  in	  
their	  domestic	  markets.	  Investors	  will	  have	  to	  get	  used	  to	  corporate	  reports	  stating	  
"our	   hardware	   products	   are	   increasingly	   subject	   to	   competition	   from	   existing	   and	  
new	  entrants	  from	  emerging	  markets	  such	  as	  China,	  which	  compete	  aggressively	  on	  
price	   at	   the	   lower	  priced	   end	  of	   the	  market."22	   The	   response	  of	  Western	   firms	   to	  
high-­‐volume,	   low-­‐cost	   Asian	   manufacturers	   needs	   to	   be	   high-­‐skill	   innovation	   and	  
development	  and	  highly	  customized	  designs.	  A	  recent	  study	  of	  the	  China	  effects	  on	  
technology	  and	  jobs	  in	  Europe	  concludes	  that	  around	  15	  percent	  of	  technical	  change	  
                                                
19	  Wang,	  Jun,	  John	  Whalley,	  Are	  Chinese	  Markets	  for	  Manufactured	  Products	  More	  Competitive	  than	  
in	   the	   US?:	   A	   Comparison	   of	   China	   –	   US	   Industrial	   Concentration	   Ratios,	   NBER	  Working	   Paper	   No.	  
19898,	  February	  2014.	  
20	  Michael	  Moritz’s	  posting	  on	  Linkedin	  on	  November	  12,	  2014.	  He	  is	  Chairman	  of	  Sequoia	  Capital.	  
21	   Dingel,	   Jonathan,	   The	   Determinants	   of	   Quality	   Specialization,	   The	   University	   of	   Chicago	   Booth	  
School	  of	  Business,	  November	  2014.	  
22	  Trimble	  Navigation	  Limited,	  2014	  Annual	  Report,	  p.12.	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that	   occurred	   in	   the	   past	   decade	   can	   be	   attributed	   directly	   to	   competition	   from	  
Chinese	  imports.23	  There	  will	  be	  no	  place	  for	  complacency.	  	  
To	   conquer	   markets	   in	   advanced	   economies,	   Asian	   firms	   (other	   than	   Japanese,	  
South	   Korean	   and	   Taiwanese	   multinationals)	   will	   need	   to	   adjust	   to	   the	   new	  
competitiveness	   paradigm	   taking	   hold	   in	   affluent	   markets	   and	   significantly	   raise	  
their	   R&D	   expenditures	   to	   match	   the	   innovativeness,	   the	   design	   excellence	   and	  
product	   quality	   levels	   attained	  by	   the	   global	   leaders	   in	   their	   industry.	  Whether	  or	  
not	  Chinese,	  Indian	  and	  Indonesian	  companies	  will	  be	  as	  successful	  as	  Japanese	  and	  
South	   Korean	   firms	   in	   establishing	   global	   brands	   in	   the	   manufacturing	   sector	  
remains	  an	  open	  question.	  The	  few	  exceptions	  that	  confirm	  the	  rule,	  such	  as	  Haier	  in	  
consumer	  appliances,	  Huawei	  in	  telecommunications	  equipment,	  Lenovo	  in	  personal	  
computers,	   Sany	   in	   digging	   equipment,	   Aditya	   Birla	   Group,	   the	   world’s	   largest	  
aluminium	  rolling	  company	  and	  the	  world’s	  largest	  producer	  of	  viscose	  stable	  fiber,	  
and	  Tata	  Communications,	  the	  world’s	  largest	  fibre-­‐optic	  network,	  show	  that	  this	  is	  
not	  out	  of	  reach.	  
The	  Third	  Plenary	  Session	  of	  the	  18th	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  
Party	   in	   November	   2012	   initiated	   significant	   departures	   from	   China’s	   habitual	  
policies	   towards	   foreign	   direct	   investments.	   In	   August	   2013,	   the	   State	   Council	  
established	   a	   free	   trade	   zone	   ("FTZ")	   in	   Shanghai	   as	   a	   means	   to	   reduce	   the	  
administrative	  burden	  and	  ease	   restrictions	  on	   investments.	   The	  FTZ	   territory	  was	  
expanded	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2014	  to	  include	  Shanghai’s	  commercial	  center	  where	  major	  
multinational	   companies	  and	  Chinese	  banks	  are	   located.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	   similar	  
FTZs	  were	  created	  in	  Guangdong,	  Fujian	  and	  Tianjin.24	  The	  adoption	  of	  the	  "negative	  
                                                
23	  Bloom,	  Nicholas,	  Mirko	  Draca,	  and	  John	  Van	  Reenen,	  2011,	  Trade	  Induced	  Technical	  Change?	  The	  
Impact	  of	  Chinese	  Imports	  on	  Innovation,	  IT	  and	  Productivity,	  CEP	  Discussion	  Paper	  No.	  1000,	  London	  
Centre	  for	  Economic	  Performance.	  
24	  The	  strategic	  positioning	  of	  these	  FTZ	  is	  worthy	  of	  note.	  Tianjing	  is	  well-­‐connected	  to	  South	  Korea	  
and	  Japan,	  Guangdong	  is	  close	  to	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  Macao	  and	  Fujian	  is	  linked	  to	  Taiwan	  and	  Southeast	  
Asia.	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list"	  approach	  to	   replace	   the	   traditional	   investment	  guidelines	   is	  a	  major	  step	   that	  
conforms	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  developed	  countries	  in	  investment	  bilateral	  treaties.	  	  
The	   launch	   of	   negotiations	   of	   a	   China-­‐EU	   Bilateral	   Investment	   Treaty	   ("BIT")	   in	  
November	  2013,	  which	   followed	   the	   resumption	  of	   the	  China-­‐US	  BIT	   in	   July	  2013,	  
give	  a	  measure	  of	  China’s	  ambitions.	  A	  major	  objective	  of	  China’s	  policy	  of	  overture	  
to	  inward	  an	  doutbound	  foreign	  direct	  investments	  is	  to	  "encourage"	  Chinese	  firms	  
to	   establish	   an	   industrial	   and	   commercial	   presence	   in	   the	   major	   advanced	  
economies	  through	  the	  acquisition	  of	  advanced	  technology	  and	  high	  quality	  brands.	  
In	  2014,	  Chinese	  deals	  in	  Europe	  amounted	  to	  $18	  billion,	  up	  from	  $2	  billion	  in	  2010.	  
On	  March	  22nd,	  2015,	  China	  National	  Chemical	  Corporation	  announced	   that	   it	  was	  
acquiring	  Pirelli	   for	  $7.7	  billion.	  The	  same	   is	  happening	   in	  North	  America.	   In	  2013,	  
Shuanghui	   International	   acquired	   Smithfields,	   the	   largest	   U.S.	   pork	   producer,	   for	  
$4.7	   billion	   and	   rebranded	   itself	   WH	   Group	   to	   enhance	   its	   positioning	   in	   China.	  
Although	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  Chinese	  acquisition	  strategy,	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  
one	  pursued	  by	   the	   Japanese	   in	   the	  1980s,	   still	   has	  a	   long	  course	   to	   run,	   it	   is	   less	  
certain	   that	   Chinese	   firms	   can	  make	   the	  wrenching	   changes	   to	   their	  management	  
practices	   that	   multinational	   businesses	   required	   and	   successfully	   managed	   their	  
acquisitions.	  Other	  Asian	   industrial	   groups	  have	  already	  –	  as	   is	   the	  case	   for	   Indian	  
companies	  –	  or	  are	  expected	  to	  embark	  on	  a	  similar	  course,	  marking	  another	  phase	  
in	  the	  globalisation	  of	  business	  organizations.	  
The	  impact	  of	  the	  large	  domestic	  demand	  on	  the	  industrial	  structure	  of	  large	  Asian	  
countries	   is	  particularly	  evident	   in	   the	   resource	   industries.	   The	  expansion	  of	  Asian	  
national	   resources	   companies	   is	   driven	   by	   both	   security	   of	   supply	   concerns	   and	   a	  
commercial	  drive	  to	  access	  new	  opportunities.	  Over	  the	  past	  decade,	  Asian	  private	  
and	   state-­‐owned	   multinationals	   have	   become	   increasingly	   competitive	   in	  
international	  markets.	  Their	  successes	  have	  stroke	  fears	  in	  many	  milieus	  that	  Asian	  
state-­‐owned	  enterprises	  (SOEs)	  act	  as	  agents	  of	  their	  government	   in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  
their	   foreign	   policy	   agenda.	   There	   is	   significant	   evidence	   that,	   as	   a	   rule,	   large	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investments	  by	  Asian	  multinationals	  are	  commercially	  driven.25	  People	  familiar	  with	  
major	  Chinese	  and	  Indian	  foreign	  investment	  projects	  know	  that	  they	  have	  not	  been	  
problem-­‐free,	   often	   saddle	   with	   substantial	   cost	   overruns.	   This	   has	   not	   gone	  
unnoticed	  by	  Chinese	  authorities.26	  
A	  more	  pragmatic	   response	   to	   the	   global	   expansion	  of	  Asian	   companies	  has	  been	  
the	   increasing	  number	  of	   partnerships	  between	  Asian	   and	  Western	  multinationals	  
where	  the	  Western	  companies	  trade	  their	  international	  and	  technical	  know-­‐how	  for	  
risk	   capital	   and	  access	   to	  Chinese,	   Indian	  and	  other	   large	  Asian	  domestic	  markets.	  
The	  July	  2014	  cooperation	  agreement	  between	  SNC-­‐Lavalin	  Inc.	  and	  China	  National	  
Nuclear	   Corporation	   to	   build	   two	   CANDU	   reactors	   in	   Romania,	   followed	   by	   the	  
November	  2014	  framework	  joint	  venture	  agreement	  to	  build	  Advanced	  Fuel	  CANDU	  
Reactors	   ("AFCR")	   in	   China	   and	   develop	   opportunities	   for	   it	   globally	   constitute	   a	  
good	  example	  of	  this	  trend.	  The	  AFCR	  technology	  was	  chosen	  because	  this	  reactor	  
can	  use	   recycle	  uranium	  and	  plutonium	  produced	  by	  China’s	  growing	   fleet	  of	   light	  
water	   reactors	   ("LWR")	   and	   thus	   reduce	   considerably	   the	   hazards	   associated	  with	  
LRW	   spent	   nuclear	   fuel.	   Hence,	   the	   merits	   of	   this	   agreement	   go	   far	   beyond	   its	  
commercial	   and	   financial	   aspects;	   they	   include	   environmental	   and	   nuclear	   non-­‐
proliferation	  benefits	  of	  global	  import.	  
	   	  
                                                
25	  For	  a	  recent	  analysis,	  see	  By	  All	  Means	  Necessary,	  Elizabeth	  Economy	  and	  Michael	  Levi,	  Council	  on	  
Foreign	  Relations,	  Washington	  D.C.,	  2014	  
26	  Shao	  Ning,	  Vice-­‐President	  of	  the	  State-­‐Owned	  Assets	  Supervision	  and	  Administration	  ("SASAC")	  of	  
the	  State	  Council	  commented	  at	  the	  April	  2012	  Boao	  Forum	  for	  Asia	  that	  he	  was:	  "…concerned	  about	  
the	   Chinese	   enterprises	   going	   global	   because	   they	   lack	   the	   ability	   to	   operate	   internationally,	   have	  
limited	   talent	   available,	   and	   know	   little	   about	   the	   foreign	   investment	   environment,	   especially	   the	  
judicial	   environment".	   These	   comments	   were	   followed	   by	   the	   adoption	   of	   new	   rules	   governing	  
foreign	   investment	   by	   large	   central	   government	   controlled	   SOEs,	   "The	   Interim	   Measures	   on	  
Supervising	   and	   Managing	   Offshore	   Investments",	   State-­‐Owned	   Assets	   Supervision	   and	  
Administration	  Commission,	  18	  March	  2012.	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The	  natural	  resources	  supply	  imperative	  
The	   rapid	   rise	  of	  Asian	  economies	  will	   continue	   to	  have	  profound	   implications	   for	  
the	  world	  economy	  in	  the	  decades	  ahead.	  In	  particular,	  their	  skinny	  endowment	  in	  
natural	   resources	   in	   relation	   to	   their	   huge	   requirements	   is	   a	   major	   source	   of	  
insecurity	   about	   the	   availability	   of	   energy,	   food,	   water	   and	   other	   commodities	   in	  
sufficient	   quantities	   at	   reasonable	   conditions.	   The	   competition	   that	   ensues	   to	  
preserve	  or	   secure	  adequate	   supplies	   for	   the	   future	  accentuates	   the	   strategic	   and	  
political	   rivalries	   between	   major	   Asian	   economies	   and	   with	   bordering	   countries	  
which,	   in	  turn,	  has	  a	  corrosive	  impact	  on	  the	  trust	  that	  must	  be	  nurtured	  between	  
neighbours.	  The	  disruptions	  caused	  by	  China’s	  curtailment	  of	   rare	  earth	  exports	   in	  
2010	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   an	   incident	   in	   the	   East	   China	   Sea	   have	   demonstrated	   the	  
vulnerability	  of	  modern	  economies	  to	  the	  use	  of	  resources	  as	  political	  tools.	  	  
The	   dependence	   of	   most	   Asian	   economies	   on	   seaborne	   supply	   translates	   into	   a	  
scramble	   to	   secure	   an	   abundant	   and	   stable	   supply	   of	   natural	   resources	   which	  
increases	  volatility	   in	  world	  commodity	  prices	  and	   the	  pursuit	  of	  policies	  pregnant	  
with	  serious	  destabilizing	  effects,	  in	  the	  region	  and	  globally.	  The	  quest	  for	  resources	  
carries	   significant	   ramifications	   for	   the	   Western	   corporations	   that	   must	   compete	  
with	   state-­‐owned	   resource	   companies	   and	   Asian	   government	   initiatives	   to	   access	  
resources	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  Europe	  must	  contend	  with	  its	  vulnerability	  
to	   the	  unpredictability	  of	   supply	  of	  energy	   from	  the	  Middle-­‐East	  and	  Russia.	  Well-­‐
endowed	  in	  natural	  resources,	  Canada	  and	  the	  United	  States	  must	  decide	  what	  role	  
they	   will	   play,	   if	   any,	   to	   foster	   a	   less	   volatile	   and	   contentious	   international	  
environment	  for	  strategic	  mineral	  resources	  and	  food.	  
Nowhere	  is	  the	  energy-­‐water-­‐food	  nexus	  and	  its	  ripple	  effects	  on	  the	  environment	  
more	   challenging	   than	   in	  Asia	   since	   the	   strains	   on	   any	   one	   can	   cripple	   the	   others	  
through	  the	   interdependence	  of	  these	  resources	  on	  one	  another	  and,	   in	  a	  domino	  
effect,	   cause	   a	   disaster.	   Although	   the	   responsibility	   of	   Asian	   economies	   to	   the	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preservation	  of	  the	  global	  commons	  should	  not	  be	  eschewed,	  their	  actions	  to	  avoid	  
environment	   degradation	   and	   to	   contain	   climate	   change	   are	   first	   and	   foremost	   in	  
their	   immediate	   interest.	   Already,	   water	   pollution,	   water	   scarcity	   and	   the	  
desertification	  of	  large	  expanses	  are	  endangering	  the	  health	  of	  millions.	  Asia	  is	  also	  
highly	  vulnerable	  to	  rising	  sea	  levels	  and	  intensified	  storms.	  According	  to	  the	  Center	  
for	  Global	  Development,	  Asia	  accounts	  for	  seven	  of	  the	  world’s	  ten	  countries	  most	  
vulnerable	   to	   rising	   sea	   levels:	   Bangladesh,	   China,	   India,	   Indonesia,	   Japan,	   the	  
Philippines	  and	  Vietnam.	  42	  million	  Asian	  people	  were	  displaced	   in	  2010	  and	  2011	  
alone	  due	  to	  disasters	  caused	  by	  changes	   in	  climatic	  patterns.	  The	  high	  population	  
density,	  particularly	  in	  their	  coastal	  megacities,	  intensifies	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  challenge.	  
In	   addition	   to	   spurring	   rural-­‐urban	   migration,	   the	   consequences	   in	   terms	   of	  
inundation	   and	   salinization	   of	   agricultural	   lands,	   flooding	   and	   dwindling	   water	  
supply	   are	   wide	   ranging.	   Confronted	   with	   those	   ecological	   challenges	   and	   the	  
human	   cost	   stemming	   from	   the	   large	   proportion	   of	   their	   population	   that	   breathe	  
unsafe	  air,	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  Asian	  leaders	  are	  concluding	  that	  unless	  major	  
actions	   are	   taken,	   the	   environment	   will	   no	   longer	   be	   able	   to	   keep	   pace	   with	  
economic	  development.	  
Several	  indications	  provide	  comfort	  that	  willingness	  to	  address	  climate	  change	  at	  the	  
global	  level	  is	  firming	  up.	  The	  November	  2014	  Accord	  between	  China	  and	  the	  United	  
States	  on	  limits	  of	  CO2	  emissions	  is	  generally	  considered	  a	  meaningful	  breakthrough.	  
This	  was	  followed	  in	  December	  2014	  with	  the	  Lima	  Call	  for	  Climate	  Action	  in	  which,	  
for	  the	  first	  time,	  all	  countries	  committed	  to	  cutting	  their	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions.	  
The	  agreement	  provides	  that	  wealthy	  countries	  will	  help	  developing	  countries	  fight	  
climate	   change	   by	   offering	   climate	   aid	   and	   investing	   in	   clean	   energy	   technology.	  
Earlier	   in	   2014,	   the	  United	   States	   and	   China,	   along	  with	   12	   other	  WTO	  members,	  
have	  begun	  negotiating	  a	  plurilateral	  agreement	  on	  environment.27	  The	  purpose	  of	  
                                                
27	  This	  initiative	  builds	  upon	  the	  2012	  APEC	  member	  economies	  commitment	  to	  liberalize	  trade	  in	  54	  
environmental	  goods	  by	  capping	  tariffs	  to	  5	  percent	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2015.	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the	   Environmental	   Goods	   Agreement	   is	   to	   reduce	   tariffs	   on	   about	   400	   products	  
related	   to	   the	   fight	   against	   climate	   change.	   It	   is	   clear,	   however,	   that	   the	   key	  
milestone	  is	  the	  Paris	  conference,	   in	  December	  2015,	  where	  success	  hinges	  on	  the	  
determination	   of	   the	   four	   major	   greenhouse	   gases	   emitters	   –	   China,	   the	   United	  
States,	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  India	  –	  to	  come	  forward	  with	  proposals	  on	  curbing	  
emissions.	  
	  
Water	  insecurity	  and	  emerging	  tensions	  
Water	  stress	  is	  becoming	  a	  major	  cause	  of	  interstate	  tensions	  over	  shared	  resources,	  
exacerbating	   long-­‐time	   territorial	   disputes	   and	   imposing	   hardships	   on	   large	  
populations.	  Asia	  is	  home	  to	  many	  of	  the	  world’s	  great	  rivers	  and	  lakes,	  but	  its	  huge	  
population	  and	  exploding	  economic	  and	  agricultural	  demand	  for	  water	  make	  it	  the	  
most	   water-­‐scarce	   continent	   on	   a	   per	   capita	   basis.	   China	   and	   India,	   for	   example,	  
account	   for	   37%	   of	   the	   world’s	   population	   but	   have	   only	   10.8	   percent	   of	   its	  
freshwater.	  Many	  of	  Asia’s	  water	  sources	  cross	  national	  boundaries,	  and	  as	  less	  and	  
less	  water	   is	   available,	   tensions	  between	   riparian	   countries	  will	   rise.	   The	  potential	  
for	   conflict	   is	   further	   underscored	   by	   China’s	   control	   of	   the	   Tibetan	   Plateau,	   the	  
source	   of	   most	   rivers	   in	   Asia.28	   The	   major	   rivers	   originating	   from	   the	   Greater	  
Himalayan	   region	   are	   vulnerable	   to	   climate	   change.	   The	   serious	   threat	   to	   food	  
security	   in	   their	   downstream	   regions	   stemming	   from	   disruptions	   in	   flow	   and	  
monsoon	  patterns	   consequent	   to	  a	   reduction	   in	   snow	  and	  glacier	  meltwater	   from	  
the	   Hymalayans	   demands	   coordinate	   actions	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   long-­‐term	  
ramifications	  of	  growing	  water	  insecurity.	  	  
Efficient	   transboundary	   water	   management	   calls	   for	   regional	   collaborative	  
mechanisms	   organized	   on	   a	   wide	   basin	   basis	   encompassing	   transnational	   rivers,	  
lakes	   and	   aquifers,	   with	   norms	   and	   rules	   that	   promote	   sustainable	   practices,	  
                                                
28	  The	  major	  rivers	  originating	  from	  the	  Tibetan	  Plateau	  include	  the	  Amu	  Darya,	  the	  Brahmaputra,	  the	  
Indus,	  the	  Yangtze,	  the	  Ganges,	  the	  Yellow,	  the	  Mekong,	  the	  Irrawaddy,	  the	  Salween	  and	  the	  Tarim.	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conservation	  and	  water	  quality.	  Regional	  cooperation	  at	   the	  political	  and	  technical	  
levels	   is	   necessary	   to	   mitigate	   the	   risks	   that	   arise	   from	   the	   damming	   of	  
transboundary	   rivers	  and	   the	  overexploiting	  of	   aquifers	   that	   straddle	   international	  
borders.	   However,	   to	   date,	   India’s	   response	   to	   entreaties	   by	   its	   neighbours	  
concerning	   transboundary	   rivers	   has	   not	   been	   very	   constructive,	   a	   legacy	   of	   the	  
conflicts	  that	  have	  marred	  South	  Asia	  since	  the	  partition	  of	  India.	  For	  its	  part,	  China	  
has	   given	   the	   cold	   shoulder	   to	  multilateral	   efforts	   to	   establish	   basin	  management	  
organizations	   such	   as	   the	  Mekong	  River	   Commission	   and	   to	   co-­‐riparian	  urgings	   to	  
institutionalize	  water-­‐sharing	  arrangements.29	  The	  consequences	  of	  this	  institutional	  
deficit	   stemming	   from	   Asia’s	   murky	   hydropolitics	   are	   fraught	   with	   risks	   that	   may	  
well	   be	   more	   potent	   than	   armed	   conflicts	   since	   water	   is	   essential	   for	   food	  
production;	  its	  growing	  scarcity	  coinciding	  with	  soaring	  food	  demand	  from	  changes	  
in	   the	   diet	   of	   a	   rising	   urban	   middle-­‐class	   population	   should	   not	   be	   casually	  
dismissed.	  	  
	  
The	  rising	  challenge	  of	  food	  security	  
Food	   security	   resonates	   in	   the	   psyche	   of	   people	   and,	   therefore,	   in	   perceptions	   of	  
national	   interest.	   Consequent	   to	   rising	   incomes,	   increased	   demand	   for	   better	  
nutritional	  foods	  and	  meat-­‐rich	  diets	  will	  overwhelm	  the	  already	  stretched	  agri-­‐food	  
production	   capacity	   and	   further	   aggravate	   food	   security	   issues.	   The	   problems	   are	  
compounded	  by	   the	  short	  and	   long-­‐term	  challenges	   to	   food	  security	  posed	  by	   the	  
effects	  of	  climate	  change	  which	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  undermine	  the	  already	  precarious	  
state	  of	  food	  security	  in	  China,	  India	  and	  several	  other	  Asian	  countries.	  
                                                
29	  China	  has	  been	  more	  inclined	  to	  engage	  in	  bilateral	  agreements.	  The	  bilateral	  cooperation	  between	  
China	  and	  Russia	  over	  the	  Amur	  River,	  which	  forms	  the	  border	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  is	  a	  case	  in	  
point.	  China	  is	  party	  to	  about	  50	  bilateral	  treaties	  concerning	  transboundary	  water	  resources	  despite	  
the	   fact	   that	   many	   are	   related	   to	   multi-­‐state	   river	   basins.	   The	   sticking	   point	   about	   water	   sharing	  
agreements	  and	  basin	  management	  mechanisms	  is	  that	  they	  must	  cover	  the	  whole	  territory	  without	  
regard	  to	  national	  borders.	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The	  quest	  for	  food	  supply	  is	  not	  always	  innocuous;	  it	  can	  exacerbate	  tensions	  within	  
the	  region.	  The	  large	  increase	  in	  per	  capital	  consumption	  of	  halieutical	  products	  by	  
the	  population	  of	  China	  coupled	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  overfishing	  and	  heavy	  pollution	  in	  
inshore	  waters	  has	  led	  to	  a	  rapid	  depletion	  of	  these	  resources	  which	  used	  to	  account	  
for	  more	  than	  50	  percent	  of	  supply,	  means	  that	  the	  strong	  demand	  can	  only	  be	  met	  
by	   increased	   catches	   in	   the	   offshore	  waters.	   As	   these	  waters	   are	   often	   located	   in	  
neighboring	   countries	   EEZs	   or	   disputed	   territory,	   the	   stage	   is	   set	   for	   repeated	  
clashes	  between	  fisherman	  and	  Coast	  Guard	  authorities,	  fueling	  tensions.	  
ASEAN	   leaders	   have	   stated	   that	   "food	   security	   remains	   a	   major	   challenge	   for	  
ASEAN".30	  One	  major	  objective	  of	  the	  ASEAN	  Economic	  Community	  (AEC)	  is	  to	  build	  
a	   single	  market	   and	   production	   base	   in	   the	   agriculture	   and	   fisheries	   sectors.	   It	   is	  
expected	   that	   community	   wide	   standardisation	   mechanisms,	   coupled	   with	   single	  
window	  policies,	  more	  harmonious	   safety	   standards	  and	   integrated	   transportation	  
systems,	  will	   constitute	  powerful	  drivers	  of	   regional	   food	   trade	  and	  enhance	   their	  
competitiveness	  as	  agri-­‐food	  exporters	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  
To	  cope	  with	  the	  food	  security	  challenge,	  food	  imports	  will	  have	  to	  be	  increased	  and	  
an	   active	   foreign	   investment	   strategy	   in	   sectors	   where	   domestic	   production	   is	  
unlikely	   to	  meet	   demand	  may	   need	   to	   be	   pursued.	   China,	   in	   particular,	   has	   been	  
very	  determined	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  such	  strategic	  responses.	   In	  this	  context,	  thriving	  
and	  healthy	  agri-­‐food	  relationships	  with	  the	  European	  Union,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  
Canada	  would	  bring	  immense	  benefits	  to	  all	  parties.	  The	  fear	  that	  the	  United	  States	  
could	   leverage	   food	  supply	   for	  political	  or	  diplomatic	  gains	  against	  China	  does	  not	  
stand	   to	   close	   scrutiny.	   Hence,	   concerted	   efforts	   should	   be	   made	   to	   hasten	   the	  
spread	  of	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  food	  security	  strategy	  where	  international	  agricultural	  
and	   food	   resources	   are	   assigned	   a	  much	   larger	   role	   in	   addressing	   the	   Asian	   food	  
challenges.	  
	  
                                                
30	  Leaders	  statement	  at	  the	  21st	  ASEAN	  Summit	  held	  in	  Cambodia	  in	  2012.	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Energy	  matters	  
According	  to	  the	  ADB,	  by	  2035,	  most	  Asian	  countries	  will	  produce	  less	  than	  half	  the	  
energy	   they	  need,	   and	  many	  will	   produce	  only	   a	   tiny	   fraction.	  Asia	   is	   thus	  heavily	  
dependent	   on	   global	   markets	   to	   ensure	   the	   energy	   supplies	   necessary	   to	   sustain	  
continued	   economic	   growth	   and	   eradicate	   poverty.	   Asia’s	   trajectory	   toward	  
increasing	   energy	   dependence	   spurs	   actions	   to	   diversity	   both	   the	   supply	   and	   fuel	  
sources,	   lessen	   the	   detrimental	   impact	   on	   the	   environment	   and	   reduce	   the	  
vulnerability	  of	   the	   lines	  of	   supply	   to	  disruptions	  and	   threats	   from	  unfriendly	  acts.	  
These	  issues	  are	  bound	  to	  be	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  national	  and	  international	  debates	  
for	  years	  to	  come.	  
In	   Asia,	   coal	   is	   the	   cheapest	   fuel	   source,	   easy	   to	   transport,	   and	   available	   from	  
multiple	  suppliers,	  which	  explains	  why	  demand	  was	  up	  over	  400	  percent	  from	  1980	  
to	   2010.	   Coal	   will	   continue	   to	   play	   a	   central	   role	   in	   Asia’s	   energy	   mix	   for	   the	  
foreseeable	   future	   despite	   the	   real	   efforts	   of	   Asian	   countries	   to	   insulate	   their	  
economies	  from	  price	  shocks	  and	  supply	  disruptions	  by	  employing	  all	  available	  fuel	  
sources,	   including	   coal,	   gas,	   nuclear,	   and	   renewable	   energy	   resources,	   to	  diversify	  
their	  energy	  mix.	  For	   instance,	   in	  China,	   the	  growth	  of	  coal	  use	  has	  been	  curtailed	  
from	  9	  percent	  in	  2011	  to	  2	  percent	  in	  2013.	  Rising	  energy	  consumption	  from	  fossil	  
fuels	   has	   serious	   implications	   for	   the	   environment.	  Meeting	   climate	   change	   goals	  
and	   safeguarding	   the	   environment	   necessitate	   the	   adoption	   of	   measures	   and	  
technologies	   to	   improve	   energy	   efficiency,	   the	   widespread	   use	   of	   clean	   coal	  
technology	  (CCT)	  and	  heavy	  reliance	  on	  hydro	  and	  nuclear	  power	  for	  electricity	  base	  
load.	  
The	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  hydrocarbon	  supply	  lines	  is	  another	  major	  source	  of	  security	  
concerns:	   Japan	   and	   South	   Korea	   are	   almost	   completely	   dependent	   on	   seaborne	  
imports;	  China	  and	   India	   import	  90	  percent	  of	   their	  needs	  by	  sea.	  The	  bulk	  of	   this	  
cargo	  which	  transits	  from	  the	  Arabian	  Sea	  to	  the	  South	  China	  seas	  relies	  on	  the	  U.S.	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Navy	  to	  patrol	  and	  secure	  Indo-­‐Pacific	  sea	  lanes,	  a	  situation	  not	  totally	  satisfactory	  
from	  a	  Chinese	  perspective.	  	  
The	  past	  decade	  has	  seen	  a	  radical	  shift	  in	  the	  global	  energy	  map	  as	  unconventional	  
oil	   and	   gas	   production	   in	   Canada	   and	   the	   United	   States	   is	   ramping	   up	   at	   levels	  
sufficient	  to	  displace	  traditional	  suppliers	  on	  the	  international	  energy	  market.	  Now	  
that	  the	  United	  States	  is	  no	  longer	  dependent	  on	  the	  oil	  rich	  regions	  of	  the	  Persian	  
Gulf,	  its	  commitment	  to	  Gulf	  security	  is	  bound	  to	  weaken,	  notwithstanding	  the	  fears	  
that	   the	   region	   is	   increasingly	  unstable.	   Indeed,	   the	  proposition	   that	   guaranteeing	  
stability	  in	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  core	  U.S.	  interest	  is	  gaining	  currency.	  What	  
this	  means	   for	   the	   European	  Union	   and	  Asian	   countries	   that	  will	   be	   tributaries	   of	  
Middle	  East	  oil	  producers	  is	  a	  question	  that	  is	  bound	  to	  come	  to	  fore.	  
The	  energy	  interest	  of	  Northeast	  Asia	  and	  North	  America	  are	  closely	  aligned.	  Rising	  
Asian	  demand,	  the	  relative	  abundance	  of	  North	  American	  energy	  resources	  and	  the	  
commercial	   viability	   of	   the	   new	   supplies	   are	   propitious	   conditions	   for	   increasing	  
trans-­‐pacific	   energy	   trade.	   Security	   is	   significantly	   improved	   since	   the	   North	  
American	   countries	   are	   politically	  mature	   and	   stable	   and	  maritime	   transport	   over	  
the	   Pacific	   avoids	   the	   chokepoints	   in	   the	   Indo-­‐Pacific	   sea	   lanes	   and	  other	   threats,	  
real	  or	  potential,	  in	  the	  China	  seas.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  high-­‐probability	  
threats	   to	   regional	  maritime	   energy	   security	   in	   the	   Indo-­‐Pacific	   straights	   are	   non-­‐
state	  threats	  –	  extreme	  weather,	  seismic	  activity,	  and	  piracy	  –	  rather	  than	  states.	  
Reaping	   the	  benefits	  of	   this	  profound	  paradigm	  shift	   in	  energy	   trade	   is	  dependent	  
on	  the	  ability	  to	  overcome	  two	  major	  inhibitors	  that	  shackle	  the	  development	  of	  this	  
new	   commerce.	   The	   first	   pertains	   to	   transportation	   infrastructure	  which	  will	   be	   a	  
key	  factor	  in	  determining	  how	  much	  energy	  is	  exported	  from	  North	  America	  to	  Asia	  
and	  Europe.	  The	  second	  impediment	  is	  the	  local	  and	  regulatory	  barriers	  that	  hinder	  
the	   North	   American	   development	   of	   domestic	   energy	   infrastructure	   projects.	   The	  
consequence	  of	  such	  domestic	  procrastination	  on	  the	  standing	  of	  both	  Canada	  and	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the	  United	  States	  in	  international	  fora	  as	  proponents	  of	  open	  and	  transparent	  global	  
markets	  is	  that	  it	  seriously	  undermines	  their	  influence	  and	  capacity	  to	  lead.	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  virtues	  of	  North	  American	  energy	  supply,	  it	  is	  implausible	  that	  
China	  would	  allow	   itself	   to	  become	  dependent	  on	   this	   source	   to	   satisfy	   its	  energy	  
needs.	  Moreover,	  China	  critical	  domestic	  resource	  shortages	  include	  food	  and	  many	  
other	   mineral	   resources.	   In	   its	   global	   quest	   for	   resources,	   the	   main	   strategic	  
challenge	   is	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   source	   and	   supply	   lines	   are	   located,	   as	   much	   as	  
possible,	  within	  an	  environment	  under	  its	  control	  or	  influence.	  The	  implementation	  
of	  this	  strategic	  imperative	  has	  two	  major	  strands.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  secure	  access	  to	  the	  
Indian	   Ocean,	   both	   in	   peacetime	   and	   in	   wartime,	   a	   concern	   exacerbated	   by	   its	  
conviction	   that	   India’s	   current	   and	  expanding	  naval	   capabilities,	   particularly	   in	   the	  
Bay	  of	  Bengal	  and	  on	  the	  western	  Indian	  Ocean	  close	  to	  Africa,	  could	  easily	  curtail	  
merchant	   and	   navy	   movements.	   In	   order	   to	   reduce	   its	   vulnerability,	   China	   has	  
embarked	  on	  a	  comprehensive	  program	  aimed	  at	  circumventing	  the	  need	  to	  transit	  
through	  critical	  choke	  points.	  Its	  strategic	  initiatives	  include	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  
deep-­‐sea	   port	   of	   Gwadar,	   located	   close	   to	   the	   Iranian	   border	   and	   the	   Strait	   of	  
Hormuz,	   and	  overland	   transportation	   routes	   through	  Pakistan,	   the	   construction	  of	  
ports	   and	   overland	   routes	   through	   Myanmar	   and	   the	   promotion	   of	   trade	   and	  
investment	  to	  reinforce	  economic	  integration	  through	  bilateral	  cooperative	  treaties	  
to	  facilitate	  commerce	  with	  China.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  New	  Delhi	  has	  been	  alarmed	  by	  
Beijing	   concerted	   actions	  which	   is	   viewed	   as	   expansionist	   and	   aimed	   at	   encircling	  
India,	   a	   suspicion	   fed	  by	   its	   growing	   conviction	   that	   the	   local	  military	   balance	  has	  
tilted	  in	  China’s	  favor.	  
China’s	   preoccupation	   with	   the	   security	   of	   supply	   across	   the	   Indian-­‐Pacific	  
waterways	   is	   a	  major	   factor	  underlying	   the	  major	  build-­‐up	  of	   its	  naval	   capabilities	  
and	  the	  increase	  in	  naval	  cooperation	  with	  Bangladesh,	  Sri	  Lanka	  and	  the	  Maldives.	  
China’s	  modernization	  of	   its	   navy	  has	   spurred	   actions	   in	   the	  Asian	   countries	  most	  
vulnerable	   to	  China’s	  assertiveness,	  with	   the	  allure	  of	  an	  arms	  race	   in	   the	  making.	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This	   has	   taken	   the	   form	   of	   substantial	   investments	   in	   the	   acquisition	   of	   naval	  
capabilities,	  to	  the	  conduct	  of	  naval	  exercises	  with	  the	  U.S.	  Navy,	  the	  conclusion	  of	  
revitalized	  bilateral	  security	  alliances	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and,	  concurrently,	   the	  
establishment	  of	  a	  web	  of	  intra-­‐Asian	  bilateral	  political	  and	  security	  relationships	  to	  
augment	  their	  military	  capabilities	  and	  assuage	  their	  concerns	  about	  Washington’s	  
ability	  to	  honour	  its	  defense	  commitments.	  
	  
Infrastructure	  Diplomacy	  
In	   October	   2013,	   in	   a	   speech	   to	   the	   parliament	   of	   Indonesia,	   President	   Xi	   Jinping	  
unveiled	  China’s	  21st	  Century	  Maritime	  Silk	  Road	  proposal.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  expand	  port	  
access	   to	   facilitate	   maritime	   trade	   across	   Southeast	   Asia,	   South	   Asia,	   the	   African	  
coast	   and	   the	   Mediterranean.	   Although	   the	   benefits	   of	   enhanced	   regional	  
connectivity	  are	  generally	  acknowledge,	  the	  strategic	  implications	  have	  given	  rise	  to	  
concerns	   about	   its	   merits	   until	   such	   time	   as	   the	   South	   China	   Sea	   disputes	   are	  
resolved.	  The	  claim	  that	  the	  Maritime	  Silk	  Road	  infrastructure	  will	  be	  used	  solely	  for	  
economic	  purposed	  is	  met	  with	  skepticism.	  Concerns	  about	  China’s	  true	  motivations	  
are	   heightened	   by	   indications	   that	   the	   Maritime	   Silk	   Road	   passes	   through	   the	  
disputed	   South	   China	   Sea,	   an	   aspect	   that	   would	   have	   serious	   implications	   on	  
regional	   security.	   Questions	   about	   the	   roles	   the	   Chinese	   navy	   and	   maritime	   law	  
enforcement	   agencies	   will	   eventually	   play	   in	   the	   Maritime	   Silk	   Road	   remain	  
unanswered.	   These	   uncertainties	   have	   fueled	   domestic	   debates	   in	   key	   Asian	  
countries	   that	  may	  make	   it	   difficult	   for	   China	   to	   implement	   its	   project	  within	   the	  
timeframe	  it	  anticipates.	  
The	   second	   strand	   of	   China’s	   strategy	   to	   open	   markets	   and	   secure	   resources	   is	  
embodied	  in	  the	  Silk	  Road	  Economic	  Belt	  proposal	  put	  forth	  by	  President	  Xi	  Jinping	  
during	  his	  September	  2013	  visit	  to	  Kazakhstan.	  This	  continental	  expansion	  policy	   is	  
designed	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  huge	  resources	  in	  the	  Russian	  Far	  East,	  in	  Mongolia,	  
and	   Central	   Asia	   through	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   Eurasian	   "economic	   corridor"	   linking	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Asian	  and	  European	  markets.	  From	  a	  Chinese	  perspective,	   these	  new	  trade	   routes	  
are	  seen	  as	  a	  means	  to	  boost	  exports,	  provide	  new	  markets	  to	  important	  domestic	  
industries	  and	  spur	  economic	  growth	  in	  China’s	  interior	  and	  western	  provinces	  that	  
have	   lagged	   far	  behind	   in	   the	   last	  decades.	  China’s	   "infrastructure	  diplomacy"	   can	  
also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  need	  to	  strengthen	  relations	  with	  countries	  on	  its	  
continental	   periphery	   to	   compensate	   for	   the	   strained	   relations	   with	   its	   maritime	  
neighbours.	  	  
The	  Silk	  Roads	  initiatives	  are	  a	  priority	  in	  Beijing’s	  economic	  and	  foreign	  policies.	  The	  
proposals	   are	   included	   in	   the	   Resolution	   of	   the	   Third	   Plenum	   of	   the	   18th	   Central	  
Committee	  of	   the	  Chinese	  Communist	   Party.	   They	  were	  highlighted	   as	   one	  of	   the	  
priorities	  for	  China	  in	  2015	  at	  the	  annual	  central	  conference	  on	  economic	  affairs	  in	  
December	  2014.	   In	  the	  pursuit	  of	   its	  strategy,	  China	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  über-­‐realist	  
power,	   implementing	  a	  modern	  version	  of	  colonialism;	  no	  political	  border	  need	  to	  
change.	  President	  Xi	  Jinping’s	  commitment	  in	  October	  2014	  to	  allocate	  $50	  billion	  to	  
the	   capital	   of	   China’s	   proposed	   AIIB,followed	   by	   his	   announcement	   in	   November	  
2014	  of	  a	  US	  $40	  billion	  infrastructure	  fund	  focused	  on	  improving	  the	  connectivity	  –	  
via	   road,	   rail	   and	   telecommunication	   –	   between	   China	   and	   its	   neighbouring	  
countries	   to	   improve	   trade	   and	   other	   exchanges	   are	   clear	   indications	   of	   their	  
determination	  to	  get	  it	  done.	  
Geography	  is	  a	  powerful	  determinant	  of	  policies.	  The	  outcome	  of	  China’s	  expansion	  
strategy	   is	   that	   it	   will	   increasingly	   become	   a	   continental	   power.	   The	   success	   in	  
establishing	  efficient	  land	  connectivity	  between	  South/Central	  Asia	  with	  ASEAN	  and	  
southern	  China	  will	  diminish	  the	  relevance	  of	  regional	  institutions	  focused	  solely	  on	  
Maritime	  Asia	  such	  as	  APEC,	  unless	  its	  membership	  is	  expanded	  to	  include	  India	  and	  
continental	   Asian	   countries.	   Géographie	   oblige!	   Failure	   to	   do	   so	   would	   likely	   see	  
competing	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  Shanghai	  Cooperation	  Organization	  strengthening	  
considerably	  or	  APEC	  being	   replaced,	   for	   all	   intent	   and	  purposes,	  by	   the	  East	  Asia	  
Summit	  as	  the	  preeminent	  venue	  for	  summit-­‐level	  gatherings	  to	  address	  economic	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as	  well	  as	  traditional	  and	  non-­‐traditional	  security	  matters	  in	  the	  Asian	  region.	  Such	  
an	  institutional	  evolution	  would	  confirm	  the	  erosion	  of	  the	  Western	  influence	  in	  the	  
extended	   Asian	   region	   relative	   to	   China,	   India	   and	   Russia,	   since	   only	   the	   United	  
States	  is	  a	  member.31	  	  
	  
Neither	  allies	  nor	  enemies	  
U.S.-­‐China	  relations	  are	  undoubtedly	  one	  of	  the	  most	  potent	  bilateral	  relationships	  
in	   the	  world.	   If	   its	   rise	   is	   sustained,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	  China	  will	   soon	  pose	  a	  decisive	  
challenge	   to	  U.S.	   primacy	   in	  Asia.	   The	  prognostics	   on	   the	   future	  of	   Sino-­‐American	  
relations	  vary	  from	  the	  cautious	  to	  the	  optimistic.	  Kevin	  Rudd	  cautions	  that	  “history	  
is	  not	  overburdened	  with	  examples	  of	  how	  such	  transitions	  in	  geopolitical	  and	  geo-­‐
economic	   realities	   have	   been	   accommodated	   peacefully”,32	   while	   Henry	   Kissinger	  
pragmatically	  suggests	  that	  “the	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  relationship	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  
as	  a	  zero-­‐sum	  game,	  nor	  can	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  prosperous	  and	  powerful	  China	  be	  
assumed	   in	   itself	   to	   be	   an	   American	   strategic	   defeat.”33	   Paradoxically,	   the	   United	  
States	   involvement	   in	  Asia	  could	  be	  seen	  by	  all	  major	  actors,	   including	  China,	  as	  a	  
constructive	   force	   preventing	   rivalry	   between	   Asian	   powers	   from	   spiralling	   out	   of	  
control.	   The	   prevalent	   view	   held	   by	   Asian	   leaders	   is	   that	   the	   United	   States	   has	  
underwritten	  the	  long	  period	  of	  peace,	  security	  and	  stability	  in	  the	  region	  which	  has	  
undergirded	  its	  prosperity.	   It	   is	  often	  forgotten	  that	  one	  of	  the	  U.S.	  trump	  cards	  in	  
Asia	  is	  that,	  contrary	  to	  all	  other	  powers	  jockeying	  for	  position,	   it	  has	  no	  territorial	  
ambitions	  in	  the	  area.	  Clearly,	  defending	  strict	  adherence	  to	  the	  UN	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  
                                                
31	  The	  East	  Asian	  Summit	  is	  composed	  of	  ASEAN	  +	  6	  plus	  USA	  and	  Russia.	  ASEAN	  +	  6	  is	  composed	  of	  
the	  10	  ASEAN	  members	  plus	  Australia,	  China,	  India,	  Japan,	  New	  Zealand	  and	  South	  Korea.	  
32	  Kevin	  Rudd,	  Remarks	  at	  the	  70th	  Morrison	  Lecture,	  Australia	  2011.	  Mr.	  Rudd	  is	  a	  former	  Australian	  
Foreign	  Minister.	  
33	  Henri	  Kissinger,	  The	  Future	  of	  U.S.-­‐Chinese	  Relations,	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  March/April	  2012.	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Convention	   does	   not	   carry	   the	   same	   stigma	   as	   offensive	   actions	   to	   assert	   one’s	  
ownership	  of	  disputed	  territories.34	  
Although	  China	  has	  not	  been	  involved	  in	  armed	  conflict	  with	  a	  neighbour	  since	  the	  
Sino-­‐Vietnam	   War	   of	   1979,	   several	   flash-­‐points	   could	   rapidly	   enflame	   and	   raise	  
tensions	  to	  the	  level	  of	  armed	  conflicts.35	  China’s	  actions	  in	  the	  diplomatic	  spat	  with	  
Japan	   over	   the	   disputed	   Diaoyu/Senkaku	   Islands	   and	   with	   the	   Philippines	   and	  
Vietnam	  over	  the	  Spratly	  Islands	  are	  seen	  as	  a	  harbinger	  of	  things	  to	  come.	  Tit-­‐for-­‐
tat	   actions	   could	   spiral	   out	   of	   control	   even	   if	   some	  of	   them	   in	   and	   of	   themselves	  
have	   little	   practical	   consequences.	   China’s	   declaration	   of	   an	   Air	   Defence	  
Identification	  Zone	   (ADIZ)	  over	  a	   large	  section	  of	   the	  East	  China	  Sea,	   including	   the	  
Diaoyu/Senkaku	   Islands,	   is	   a	   case	   in	   point.	   In	   international	   law,	   ADIZ	   do	   not	  
necessarily	  correspond	  to	  territorial	  limits;	  for	  example,	  Canada’s	  ADIZ	  covers	  half	  of	  
the	  Artic	  Archipelago.	  The	  situation	  would	  become	  much	  more	  problematic	  if	  Beijing	  
unitarily	   declared	   an	   ADIZ	   over	   the	   entire	   South	   China	   Sea	   even	   though	   it	   would	  
have	  no	  territorial	  basis	  in	  international	  law.	  The	  building	  of	  artificial	  islands	  on	  tiny	  
outcroppings,	   atolls	   and	   reefs	   in	   the	   Spratly	   Archipelago	   to	   support	   its	   claims	   to	  
about	  85	  percent	  of	   the	  South	  China	  Sea	  casts	  China	  as	  a	  bully	   since	   this	   string	  of	  
promontories	   is	   well	   within	   the	   exclusive	   economic	   zones	   of	   the	   Philippines,	  
Malaysia	  and	  Vietnam.	  The	  fear	  is	  that	  tensions	  arising	  from	  the	  territorial	  disputes	  
with	   China,	   the	   status	   of	   Taiwan	   or	   from	   lethal	   provocations	   or	   collapse	   of	  North	  
Korea,	  could	  escalate	  into	  protracted	  conflicts	  since	  the	  United	  States	  is	  often	  bound	  
by	  a	  security	  alliance	  with	  aggrieved	  countries.	  	  
The	   importance	  ASEAN,	   Australia,	   Japan,	   South	   Korea	   and	   the	  United	   States	   have	  
been	   giving	   to	   their	   relations	  with	   India	   are,	   to	   a	   large	   extent,	   prompted	   by	   their	  
                                                
34	  See	  statement	  of	  Secretary	  Clinton	  at	  the	  2010	  annual	  meeting	  of	  the	  ASEAN	  Regional	  Forum	  and	  
Bader	  J.A.,	  Obama	  and	  China’s	  Rise	  –	  An	  insider	  account	  of	  America’s	  Asia	  Strategy,	  Brookings	  2012.	  
35	  Previous	  military	  conflicts	  subsequent	  to	  the	  Korean	  War	  include	  the	  Taiwan	  Strait	  Crises	  of	  1954	  
and	  1958,	   the	   Indian	  border	  clash	  of	  1962	  and	   the	  conflict	  with	   the	  USSR	  along	   the	  Ussuri	  River	   in	  
1969-­‐71.	  All	  these	  conflicts	  were	  in	  China’s	  immediate	  periphery.	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determination	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   Asian	   security	   environment	   remains	   pluralistic	  
rather	   than	   Sinocentric.	   Moreover,	   India’s	   democratic	   polity	   is	   seen	   as	   a	  
fundamental	   value,	   a	   character	   that	  makes	   it	   a	   desirable	   partner	   for	   many	   Asian	  
countries,	   the	   USA	   and	   other	   democratic	   countries,	   despite	   its	   often	   chaotic	   and	  
unpredictable	   workings.	   After	   decades	   of	   estrangement,	   the	   rapprochement	  
between	   the	  United	  States	  and	   India	   initiated	  by	  President	  Clinton,	  engineered	  by	  
President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  and	  nurtured	  by	  President	  Barack	  Obama	  is	  significant.36	  
The	  tangled	  relationships	  with	  Pakistan	  have	  long	  been	  a	  major	  impediment	  to	  US-­‐
India	  cooperation.37	  However,	  with	  the	  pull-­‐out	  from	  Afghanistan,	  Pakistan	  is	  bound	  
to	  lose	  significance	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  two	  countries	  share	  a	  growing	  distrust	  
of	  Pakistan	  and	  are	  alarmed	  by	  the	  widespread	  extremism	  there.	  The	  demonstrated	  
perfidy	  of	  its	  military	  apparatus,	  the	  high	  level	  of	  corruption	  that	  mires	  the	  society,	  
its	  toxic	  politics	  with	  an	  overt	  anti-­‐American	  strand	  and	  the	  country’s	  historical	  ties	  
to	   China	   and	   support	   for	   Iran’s	   nuclear	   program	   are	   not	   enticing	   factors	   for	   the	  
United	   States	   whereas	   India	   has	   clear	   geostrategic	   value	   as	   a	   force	   capable	   of	  
influencing	  its	  closest	  neighbors	  in	  ways	  that	  advances	  U.S.	  security	  interests	  and	  as	  
a	  counterweight	  to	  China’s	  rise.	  	  
India’s	   Prime	  Minister	  Modi	   appears	   to	   be	   extirpating	   his	   country	   from	   the	   long-­‐
shadow	  of	  non-­‐alignment	  which	  may	  have	  given	  it	  a	  moral	  high	  ground	  to	  soothe	  its	  
self-­‐esteem	  but	   little	  else.	   The	  defining	   characteristic	  of	   the	   relations	  with	   India	   is	  
the	  mirror	   image	   of	   the	   one	  with	   China:	  whereas	  with	   the	   latter,	   strategic	   rivalry	  
coexists	   with	   economic	   interdependence,	   with	   the	   former,	   strategic	   convergence	  
has	   not	   translated	   into	   deep	   economic	   intercourse.	   Modi	   appears	   determined	   to	  
seize	  the	  opportunity	  presented	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Asian	  countries	  want	  to	  strengthen	  
their	  economic	  ties	  with	  India	  as	  an	  economic	  hedge	  against	  overdependence	  on	  the	  
Chinese	  market.	  The	  pragmatic	  makeover	  of	   India’s	  foreign	  policy	  manifested	  itself	  
                                                
36	  There	  have	  been	  only	  three	  U.S.	  Presidential	  visits	  to	  India	  between	  1947	  and	  1999.	  Since	  2000,	  all	  
Presidents	  have	  visited	  India;	  President	  Obama	  went	  twice.	  
37	  Talbott,	  Strobe,	  Engaging	  India,	  Diplomacy,	  Democracy	  and	  the	  Bomb,	  Brookings	  Institution	  Press,	  
2004.	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through	  a	  renewed	  attention	  towards	  Southeast	  Asia	  and	  its	  new	  "Act	  East"	  policy	  –	  
in	   formal	   opposition	   to	   the	   ineffective	   previous	   "Look	   East"	   policy.	   The	   India-­‐Sri	  
Lanka	   civil	   nuclear	   cooperation	   agreement	   concluded	   on	   February	   17,	   2015	   in	  
accordance	  with	   the	   International	   Atomic	   Energy	   Agency	   protocols,	   demonstrates	  
that	  India	  "means	  business".	  The	  strongest	  break	  with	  the	  past	  is	  the	  "India-­‐US	  Joint	  
Strategic	   Vision	   for	   the	   Asia-­‐Pacific	   and	   Indian	   Ocean	   Region",	   issued	   during	  
President	  Obama’s	  visit	   to	  New	  Delhi	  on	   January	  26,	  2015.	  The	  document	  accords	  
prominence	  to	  India	  in	  the	  area	  between	  Africa	  and	  East	  Asia	  and	  draws	  India	  into	  
partnership	  with	   the	  US	   in	   policing	  maritime	   security,	   "navigation	   and	  over	   flights	  
throughout	   the	   region	  especially	   in	   the	  South	  China	  Sea".	  Another	   joint	   statement	  
implicitly	  criticizing	  Chinese	  behavior	  was	  issued	  with	  Vietnam.	  	  
Being	  outspoken	  about	  substantive	  issues	  does	  not	  imply	  a	  more	  hostile	  approach.	  
The	   shift	   in	   India’s	   foreign	   policy	   approach	   and	   the	   rapprochement	   with	   United	  
States	  does	  not	  foreclose	  New	  Delhi’s	  ability	  to	  conduct	  its	  affairs	  on	  its	  own	  terms	  
which,	  at	  times,	  may	  conflict	  with	  Washington’s	  preferences.	  New	  Delhi	  will	  seek	  to	  
maintain	  an	   independent	   foreign	  policy	  devoid	  of	  alignment	   in	  order	  to	  protect	   its	  
strategic	  autonomy.	  New	  Delhi	  will	  resist	  playing	  the	  role	  of	  a	  balancer	  against	  China	  
and	   being	   drawn	   into	   overt	   antagonism	  with	   Beijing.	   India	   is	  much	  more	   likely	   to	  
engage	  China	  diplomatically	  and	  economically	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  contain	  it.	  A	  few	  
days	   after	   President	  Obama’s	   visit,	   Indian	   foreign	  minister	   Susha	   Swaraj	   attended	  
the	   Second	   India-­‐China	   Media	   Forum	   in	   Beijing	   where	   she	   spoke	   of	   the	   current	  
century	  being	  an	  Asian	  one.	  Prime	  Minister	  Modi	  will	  be	  visiting	  Beijing	  in	  May	  2015,	  
where	  his	  priority	  will	  be	  focused	  on	  reviving	  domestic	  growth	  and	  increasing	  trade	  
with	   its	   largest	   trading	   partner.	   New	   Delhi’s	   approach	   is	   in	   synch	   with	   China’s	  
strategy	  which	   favors	   a	   comprehensive	   engagement	   to	   immunize	   the	   relationship	  
from	  points	  of	  friction	  growing	  out	  of	  control	  by	  increasing	  the	  costs	  of	  reverting	  to	  
confrontation	  and	  preventing	  any	  one	  point	  of	  contention	  from	  defining	  the	  terms	  
of	  the	  relationship.	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There	  should	  be	  no	  illusion;	  India	  will	  most	  likely	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  dyspeptic	  partner	  
for	  the	  United	  States	  efforts	  to	  address	  major	  multilateral	  issues.	  India	  will	  maintain	  
privileged	  relations	  with	  Russia,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  Modi,	  "India’s	  most	  
important	   defence	   partner".	  During	   the	   recent	   visit	   of	   President	  Vladimir	   Putin	   to	  
New	  Delhi,	   India	  agreed	  to	  purchase	  12	  Russian-­‐nuclear	  reactors	  to	  address	  India’s	  
energy	  needs38	  and	  to	  manufacture	  advanced	  Russian	  military	  helicopters	   in	   India,	  
despite	   the	   United	   States	   displeasure	   at	   the	   timing	   of	   the	   deal.	   India	   has	   been	  
supportive	   of	   Russian’s	   annexation	   of	   Crimea.	   During	   the	   visit,	   India	   unveiled	   the	  
formation	  of	  an	  Indo-­‐Crimean	  Partnership	  to	  foster	  trade	  between	  India	  and	  Crimea,	  
now	  a	  Republic	  in	  the	  Russian	  Federation.	  Like	  Israel	  and	  Egypt,	  India	  intends	  to	  join	  
the	  Russian-­‐led	  free	  trade	  zone.	  The	  alignment	  with	  Russia	  must	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  India’s	  interests	  in	  Central	  Asia,	  a	  21st	  century	  version	  of	  the	  Great	  Game.	  
Despite	   enjoying	   old	   ties,	   cultural	   links	   and	   familiarity	  with	   key	   leaders,	   India	   is	   a	  
minor	   player	   in	   Central	   Asia,	   elbowed-­‐out	   by	   China,	   which	   now	   dominates	   the	  
region’s	   energy	   resources	   and	   transportation	   infrastructures	   and	   exerting	   political	  
leadership	  through	  the	  Shanghai	  Cooperation	  Council.	  Nevertheless,	  Russia	  remains	  
the	   critical	   balancer	   in	   the	   Central	   Asian	   competition	   from	   which	   India	   must	   be	  
expecting	  significant	  advantages.	  
Though	  Japan	  is	  declining	  in	  relative	  power,	   its	  economic	  might	  ensures	  that	   it	  will	  
continue	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  Asia.	  To	  strengthen	  
deterrence	   against	   emerging	   threats,	   it	   has	   embarked	   on	   a	   major	   investment	  
                                                
38	  The	  issue	  of	  trade	  in	  civil	  nuclear	  technology	  is	  a	  major	  bone	  of	  contention	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  
In	  2010,	  the	  Indian	  Parliament	  adopted	  a	  nuclear	  liability	  law	  that	  places	  excessive	  responsibilities	  on	  
suppliers	  for	  accidents	  at	  nuclear	  power	  plants,	  effectively	  deterring	  US	  and	  other	  private	  firms	  from	  
entering	   the	   Indian	  market.	   An	   understanding	   was	   reached	   during	   President	   Obama’s	   last	   visit	   to	  
India.	  	  New	  Delhi	  subsequently	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  it	  would	  not	  amend	  the	  CLND	  Act	  but	  will	  read	  the	  
CLND	  Act	  to	  mean	  that	  suppliers’	  liability	  "is	  not	  a	  mandatory	  but	  an	  enabling	  provision"	  and	  that	  the	  
CLND	   Act	   "channels	   all	   legal	   liability	   for	   nuclear	   damage	   exclusively	   to	   the	   operator."	   Whether	  
nuclear	   technology	   suppliers	  will	   consider	  a	  press	   release	   issued	  by	   the	  Ministry	  of	  External	  Affairs	  
explaining	  the	  ambit	  of	  the	  law	  as	  determinative	  of	  the	  risks	  arising	  from	  the	  provisions	  of	  Sections	  17	  
and	  46	  of	  the	  CLND	  Act	  is	  an	  open	  question.	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program	   in	   defense	   capabilities.	   Japan	   is	   also	   questioning	   the	   wisdom	   of	  
constitutional	   limits	   that	   shackle	   its	   right	   to	   collective	   self-­‐defense,	  bar	   its	  military	  
from	  war	  and	  place	  a	  straightjacket	  on	  its	  alliances.	  While	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  Japan’s	  
foreign	  policy	  remains	  the	  U.S.-­‐Japan	  alliance,	  it	  has	  systematically	  sought	  to	  nurture	  
stronger	  security	  and	  military	  relations	  with	  other	  Asian	  middle	  powers	  as	  an	  hedge	  
against	  overdependence	  on	   the	  United	  States	   security	  umbrella.	  On	   the	  economic	  
front,	   Japan	   is	  pursuing	  a	   three-­‐pronged	   trade	   strategy	  having	   joined	   the	  TPP	  and	  
the	  RCEP	  negotiations	  and	  engaged	  in	  talks	  with	  China	  and	  South	  Korea	  to	  form	  the	  
East	   Asia	   FTA.	   In	   tandem	   with	   the	   U.S.	   rapprochement	   with	   India,	   Japan	   is	  
increasingly	  turning	  to	  India	  as	  an	  economic,	  political	  and	  security	  counterweight	  to	  
China,	  a	  rational	  approach	  given	  their	  common	  interests	  in	  the	  maritime	  domain.	  
The	  convergence	  of	  Japan’s	  balancing	  strategy	  with	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  U.S.	  "pivot"	  
to	   the	   Asia-­‐Pacific	   presents	   an	   opportunity	   for	   joint	   leadership	   in	   a	   manner	   that	  
favors	  regional	  stability.	  Clearly,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  a	  strategic	  interest	  in	  assisting	  
Japan’s	   efforts	   to	   enhance	   its	   role	   in	   international	   affairs.	   The	   strengthening	   of	  
bilateral	   economic	   cooperation	   through,	   for	   example,	   a	   Japan-­‐United	   States	   FTA,	  
similarly	  to	  the	  one	  with	  South	  Korea,	  would	  constitute	  a	  step	  in	  the	  right	  direction.	  
The	  challenge	   for	   the	  United	  States	   is	   to	  prevent	   its	   actions	   in	   concert	  with	   Japan	  
from	   poisoning	   its	   critical	   relationship	   with	   China.	   In	   this	   regard,	   it	   will	   need	   to	  
become	  much	  more	  adept	  at	  managing	  the	  key	  triangle	  relationships	  (China-­‐Japan-­‐
United	  States,	  China-­‐India-­‐United	  States	  and	   India-­‐Japan-­‐United	  States)	   than	   it	  has	  
demonstrated	  in	  recent	  years.	  
The	   risks	   of	   political	  missteps	   that	  would	   create	   serious	   tensions	   and	  have	   lasting	  
economic	  consequences	  are	  aggravated	  by	  persistent	  doubts	  regarding	  the	  ability	  of	  
the	   United	   States	   to	   muster	   sufficient	   financial,	   military	   and	   soft	   power	   to	   be	  
considered	   the	  primus	   inter	   pares	   within	   the	   region,	   particularly	   by	   its	   “emerging	  
giants”.	  Comments	  by	  Asian	  analysts	  that	  Beijing	  appears	  to	  have	  concluded	  that	  the	  
United	  States	   is	  on	  an	   irreversible	  path	  of	  decline	  and	  by	  European	  officials	   to	   the	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effect	   that	   their	  Chinese	   counterparts	  exhibit	   an	  uncompromising	  attitude	   in	   their	  
encounters	   indicate	   that	   the	   likelihood	   of	   a	   serious	   miscalculation	   is	   increasing.	  
These	   are	   compounded	   by	   the	   belief	   that	   Asian	   countries	   will	   hesitate	   to	   align	  
closely	  with	  the	  United	  States	  should	  a	  limited	  conflict	  with	  China	  occur	  for	  fear	  of	  
compromising	  the	  economic	  benefits	  they	  derive	  from	  their	  commercial	  intercourse	  
with	   China.	   This	   calculus	   is	   not	   peculiar	   to	   Asia.	   How	   to	   profit	   from	   China’s	   huge	  
markets	  and	  stock	  of	  capital	  without	  becoming	  vassals	  of	  its	  considerable	  economic	  
power	  is	  a	  thorny	  issue	  in	  all	  capitals,	  including	  for	  Washington.	  Britain’s	  decision	  to	  
sign	  on	  as	  a	  founding	  member	  of	  the	  AIIB	  despite	  the	  open	  opposition	  of	  the	  United	  
States	  constitutes	  a	  stark	  illustration	  of	  this	  new	  global	  reality.	  
These	  hesitations	  confirm	  that,	  for	  good	  or	  for	  ill,	  China	  remains	  the	  central	  strategic	  
focus	  of	  Asia	  whereas	  the	  extensive	  economic,	  military	  and	  political	  presence	  of	  the	  
United	  States	   in	   the	  Asia	  Pacific	  explains	  the	  enormous	   importance	  China	  attaches	  
to	   the	   quality	   of	   its	   relations	  with	   the	  United	   States.	   This	   puts	   a	   premium	  on	   the	  
quality	   and	   continuity	   of	   an	   effective	   institutional	   dialogue	   between	   China	   and	  
United	   States	   at	   the	   highest	   levels.	   The	   Strategic	   and	   Economic	   Dialogue	   (S&ED)	  
established	  in	  2009	  by	  President	  Barack	  Obama	  and	  Chinese	  President	  Hu	  Jiantao,	  is	  
the	   key	  mechanism	   to	   fulfil	   this	   need,	   second	  only	   to	   the	   Leaders	   Summits.39	   The	  
S&ED	  is	  centered	  around	  an	  annual	  meeting	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Secretary	  of	  the	  State	  and	  
the	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Treasury	  with	  their	  Chinese	  counterparts.	  The	  extension	  of	  this	  
bilateral	  dialogue	  to	  involve	  senior	  civilians	  and	  military	  officials	  to	  sensitive	  security	  
issues	  such	  as	  nuclear	  force	  modernization,	  outer	  space,	  cyberspace,	  missile	  defence	  
and	  maritime	   security,	   including	   the	   Taiwan	   Strait,	  must	   be	   considered	   a	   positive	  
development.	   Veterans	   of	   the	   S&ED	  meetings	   observe	   that	   the	   conversations	   are	  
                                                
39	  The	  Strategic	  and	  Economic	  Dialogue	  is	  the	  successor	  to	  the	  former	  dual-­‐track	  China-­‐U.S.	  high	  level	  
mechanisms	   of	   the	   Strategic	   Economic	   Dialogue	   initiated	   in	   2005	   by	   the	   U.S.	   Secretary	   to	   the	  
Treasury,	  Hank	   Paulson,	   and	   the	   Senior	  Dialogue	   initiated	   in	   2006	  by	   the	  U.S.	  Deputy	   Secretary	   of	  
State,	  Robert	  Soellik.	  These	  mechanisms	  had	  the	  support	  of	  President	  Georges	  W.	  Bush	  and	  President	  
Hu	  Jianto.	  Their	  continuation,	  albeit	  under	  a	  new	  label,	  is	  testimony	  to	  a	  bipartisan	  consensus	  in	  the	  
U.S.	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  need	  for	  continuous	  and	  systemic	  engagement	  with	  China.	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more	  important	  than	  the	  immediate	  outcomes.	  According	  to	  former	  U.S.	  Secretary	  
of	   Defense,	   Robert	   Gates,40	   the	   process	   has	   too	   often	   been	   held	   hostage	   to	   the	  
vagaries	   of	   political	   jousts	   between	   the	   U.S.	   Congress	   and	   the	   White	   House;	  
admittedly,	  China	  is	  not	  immune	  to	  similar	  opposing	  forces	  within	  its	  leadership	  and	  
from	  powerful	  vested	   interests.	  A	  platform	  to	  exchange	  ideas	  and	  enhance	  mutual	  
understanding,	   the	   venue	   has	   nonetheless	   been	   instrumental	   in	   stabilizing	   the	  
China-­‐U.S.	   relationship	   in	   periods	   of	   tension	   and	   preventing	   the	   downward	   spiral	  
that	   was	   bound	   to	   occur	   if	   left	   unabated.	   Given	   the	   extensive	   scope	   of	   the	  
relationships	   between	   the	   two	   countries	   and	   the	   magnitude	   of	   the	   economic	  
intercourses,	   it	   is	   much	   more	   likely	   that	   progress	   will	   continue	   to	   unfold	   in	   an	  
incremental	  way	  rather	  than	  in	  transformative	  developments.	  
	  
The	  coming	  inflexion	  in	  the	  economic	  trajectory	  
The	   rapid	   ascendancy	   of	   Asia	   as	   an	   economic	   and	   political	   force	   in	   global	   world	  
affairs	  has	   lured	  many	   to	  underestimate	   the	  huge	   challenges	   that	  beset	   the	  Asian	  
economic	  engines	  and	  to	  posit	  that	  current	  economic	  trends	  would	  simply	  continue.	  
While	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  Asian	  economic	  growth	  still	  has	  a	  way	  to	  go,	  it	  
remains	  that	  the	  long-­‐term	  social	  and	  economic	  foundations	  of	  growth	  in	  both	  China	  
and	  India	  are	  more	  fragile	  than	  is	  generally	  recognized.	  
Projections	   concerning	   growth	   in	   China	   must	   contend	   with	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  
conditions	  that	  fuelled	   its	   long	  period	  of	  rapid	  economic	  growth	  are	  fading	  and,	  as	  
President	  Xi	  is	  reported	  to	  have	  said	  on	  several	  occasions,	  "Chinese	  need	  to	  adapt	  to	  
the	   new	  normal	   growth	   path".	   Between	   2000	   and	   2015,	   the	   Chinese	  working-­‐age	  
population	  will	  have	  grown	  by	  103	  million,	  a	  surge	  that	  exerted	  downward	  pressure	  
on	  wages	  and	  supercharged	   its	  export	  competitiveness.	  From	  2015	   to	  2030,	  China	  
working-­‐age	  population	  will	  shrink	  by	  69	  million,	  with	  the	  opposite	  effects.	  Around	  
                                                
40	  Robert	  M.	  Gates,	  Duty	  :	  Memoirs	  of	  a	  Secretary	  at	  War,	  2014.	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54	  percent	  of	  China’s	  population	  is	  now	  living	  in	  cities,	  indicating	  that	  it	  has	  largely	  
exhausted	  its	  surplus	  labor	  from	  rural	  areas.	  The	  inexorable	  contraction	  in	  the	  labor	  
force	   means	   that	   China	   will	   grow	   old	   before	   it	   grows	   rich,	   at	   least	   in	   per	   capita	  
terms.	  A	  similar	  reversal	  is	  occurring	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  profitability	  of	  investments	  
in	  machines	  and	  infrastructure;	  according	  to	  the	  IMF,	  capacity	  utilization	  has	  fallen	  
from	  about	  90	  percent	  in	  2000	  to	  around	  60	  percent	  in	  2011.	  
Chinese	  authorities	  are	  cognizant	  of	  the	  urgency	  “to	  stand	  up	  to	  the	  test	  of	  striding	  
over	  the	  middle-­‐income	  trap.”41	  This	  can	  only	  be	  accomplished	  through	  rebalancing	  
the	  sources	  of	  growth.	  The	  investment-­‐driven	  growth	  has	  run	  its	  course,	  leading	  to	  
worrying	   inefficiencies	   in	   the	   use	   of	   resources,	   a	   property	   bubble	   coupled	   with	  
mounting	  debt	  and	  consequent	  adverse	  financial	  consequences.	  Moreover,	  it	  would	  
be	   imprudent	   to	   rely	  on	  a	   further	   rapid	  expansion	  of	   the	   trade	  surplus	   to	   support	  
the	  domestic	  economy.	  The	  transition	  to	  a	  more	  consumption-­‐oriented	  growth	  has	  
the	  added	  benefits	  of	  slowing	  the	  pace	  of	  widening	  income	  inequality	  and	  improving	  
human	  welfare	  through	  more	  robust	  job	  creation	  and	  a	  more	  balanced	  development	  
between	   coastal	   and	   inland	   regions.	   If	   successful,	   this	   rebalancing	   would	   reduce	  
global	   economic	   imbalances	   and	   may	   reduce	   upward	   pressure	   on	   the	   price	   of	  
several	  commodities.	  However,	  the	  policy	  challenges	  these	  new	  circumstances	  bring	  
are	  of	  a	  different	  order	  of	  magnitude	  in	  complexity	  than	  what	  was	  the	  case	  in	  earlier	  
periods.	  
India	  also	  risks	  remaining	  stuck	  in	  the	  middle-­‐income	  trap,	  unless	  it	  can	  mobilize	  the	  
will	   and	   social	   consensus	   needed	   to	   adopt	   and	   implement	   appropriate	   policies,	  
arrest	  the	  rapid	  environmental	  degradation	  and	  avoid	  the	  occurrence	  of	  disruptive	  
turmoil	   fueled	   by	   its	   ethnic-­‐linguistic-­‐religious	   diversity.	   Contrary	   to	   China,	   India’s	  
demography	   is	   favorable	   and	   its	   dependency	   ratios	   are	   falling.	   This	   “demographic	  
dividend”	  will	  be	  wasted	  if	  India	  fails	  to	  ensure	  that	  its	  young	  population,	  boys	  and	  
girls,	  is	  educated	  and	  has	  access	  to	  adequate	  healthcare	  and	  nutrition.	  To	  date,	  New	  
                                                
41	  Executive	  Vice	  Premier	  Zhang	  Goali,	  June	  6th,	  2013.	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Delhi	  policies	  regarding	  human	  capital	  development	  have	  been	  a	  miserable	  failure,	  if	  
not	  in	  intent,	  for	  sure	  in	  implementation.	  The	  emergence	  of	  dynamic	  states	  growing	  
at	  or	  near	  double-­‐digit	  rates	  offers	  some	  comfort	  that	  India	  may	  gradually	  rid	  itself	  
of	  the	  stifling	  regulations	  and	  rigid	  labor	  market	  institutions	  through	  power-­‐sharing	  
arrangements	  more	  typical	  of	  a	  mature	  federation.	  
A	  more	  promising	  development	  is	  the	  decision	  of	  ASEAN	  countries	  to	  transit	  towards	  
the	  ASEAN	  Economic	  Community	  (AEC)	  as	  a	  means	  to	  make	  their	  region	  more	  self-­‐
sustaining.	   The	   goal	   is	   to	   create	   a	   single	   market	   and	   production	   base	   with	   the	  
attendant	   free	   flow	   of	   goods,	   services,	   investment,	   capital	   and	   skilled	   labor	   and,	  
thus,	  leverage	  its	  strength	  as	  a	  625-­‐million-­‐strong	  consumer	  market.	  The	  economies	  
of	  scale	  that	  will	  ensue	  are	  expected	  to	  prompt	  growth	  in	  regional	   investment	  and	  
promote	   more	   balanced	   economic	   development	   throughout	   the	   Community.	  
Although	   there	   are	   serious	   impediments	   to	   the	   AEC	   coming	   to	   fruition	   –	   political	  
divisions,	  inadequate	  institutional	  infrastructure,	  huge	  differences	  in	  member	  states’	  
levels	  of	  economic	  development	  –	   the	  successes	  achieved	  by	  ASEAN	  against	  many	  
odds	  since	  its	  founding	  in	  1967	  is	  undeniable.	  
	  
An	  uncertain	  world	  
The	  global	  dominance	  of	  Asia	  cannot	  be	  assumed	  as	  simply	  inevitable.	  China,	  India,	  
Indonesia	   and	   Japan	  are	   confronted	  by	   an	   array	  of	   domestic	   challenges	  with	   little	  
resolution	   in	   sight.	   Conversely,	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   United	   States	   and	   Europe	   to	  
rebound	  and	  embark	  on	  a	  growth	  path	  are	  too	  heavily	  discounted.	  The	  shale	  oil	  and	  
gas	   phenomena	   and	   the	   re-­‐shoring	   of	   manufacturing	   brought	   about,	   in	   part,	   by	  
advanced	  technologies,	  are	  occurring;	  they	  are	  not	  figments	  of	  imagination.	  It	  is	  also	  
worth	  keeping	  in	  mind	  that,	  in	  terms	  of	  output,	  the	  European	  Community	  and	  North	  
American	  GDP	  only	  need	  to	  increase	  by	  1.5	  percent	  to	  match	  that	  of	  China	  growing	  
at	  7	  percent.	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Nor	  should	  it	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  a	  foregone	  outcome	  that	  tensions	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  
will	   reach	   the	   boiling	   point	   and	   escalate	   into	   a	   regional	   outburst	   of	   catastrophic	  
magnitude	   arresting	   the	   spreading	   of	   prosperity	   across	   Asia.	   Beijing	   is	   firmly	  
convinced	   that	   China	   needs	   a	   stable	   international	   environment	   to	   achieve	   its	  
"Chinese	   Dream".42	   It	   has	   systematically	   engaged	   in	   economic	   integration	   and	  
cooperation	  with	  friends	  and	  foes	  to	  address	  shared	  concerns	  and	  to	  diffuse	  security	  
threats.	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  ASEAN	  economic	  interdependence	  with	  China	  has	  
intentionally	   been	  maintained	   exclusive	   from	   the	   South	   China	   Sea	   disputes.	   Asian	  
countries	   have	   demonstrated	   a	   strong	   shared	   orientation	   towards	   global	   affairs.	  
Examination	  of	  the	  voting	  record	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  between	  
1974	   and	   2008	   shows	   a	   substantial	   degree	   of	   convergence	   of	   ASEAN	   and	   China	  
voting	   patterns	  which	   is	   higher	   than	   between	   EU	  members.43	  Unlike	   the	   situation	  
that	  prevailed	  during	   the	  Cold	  War	  where	   trade	   relations	  between	   the	   Soviet	   and	  
Western	   Blocks	   were	   virtually	   non-­‐existent,	   Asia,	   especially	   China,	   is	   deeply	  
integrated	  into	  the	  world	  economy.	  Moreover,	  their	  economic	  successes	  constitute	  
a	  source	  of	  pride,	  self-­‐gratification	  and	  fulfilment	  of	  national	  aspirations	  which	  acts	  
to	   dampen	   nationalistic	   driven	   adventures.	   This	   reality	   is	   bound	   to	   weight	   in	   any	  
calculus	  of	   the	   consequences	  of	   expanding	   a	   skirmish	   into	   a	   conflict,	   although	  we	  
can	  never	  be	  certain	  that	  “cooler	  heads”	  will	  always	  prevail.	  
China	   is	   unlikely	   to	   abide	   to	   its	   "Ta	  guang	   yang	  hui,	   you	   suo	   zuo	  wei"44	   policy	   for	  
much	  longer,	  at	  least	  in	  regards	  to	  Asia.	  President	  Xi’s	  confident	  assertion	  of	  foreign	  
policy	   at	   the	   Beijing	   APEC	   Summit	   contrasted	   with	   the	   attitude	   displayed	   by	   his	  
predecessors	   for	   so	  many	  years	  and	  effectively	   relegated	   the	  United	  States	   to	   the	  
role	   of	   second-­‐fiddle.	   Notwithstanding	   the	   tensions	   in	   the	   China	   seas,	   it	   has	  
                                                
42	   The	   phrase	   coined	   by	   President	   Xi	   at	   the	   19th	   Party	   Congress	   is	   now	   standard	   in	   major	   policy	  
discussions.	  
43	  Ferdinand,	  Peter,	  Foreign	  Policy	  Convergence	   in	  Pacific	  Asia:	  The	  Evidence	   from	  Voting	   in	   the	  UN	  
General	   Assembly,	   The	   British	   Journal	   of	   Politics	   &	   International	   Relations,	   Volume	   16,	   Issue	   4,	  
November	  2014.	  
44	   Deng	   Xiaoping	   admonition	   translates	   approximately	   as,	   "Keep	   a	   low	   profile	   and	   take	   selective	  
actions."	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generally	  pursued	  a	  "good-­‐neighbourly	  relationship	  and	  partnership"	  with	  countries	  
on	   its	  periphery,	  with	  a	   strong	  emphasis	  on	  economic	   integration	  and	  multilateral	  
cooperation	  to	  foster	  confidence.	  This	  Asia-­‐centric	  mercantilist	  approach	  is	  likely	  to	  
continue	  unless	   its	   territorial	   "expansion"	  gives	   rise	   to	  nationalistic	  and	  multiracial	  
upheavals	   opposing	   China’s	   investment	   made	   in	   pursuit	   of	   its	   quest	   for	   natural	  
resources.	  However,	  there	   is	  no	  doubt	  that	  a	  geopolitical	  realignment	  will	  occur	  at	  
the	  world	  level	  in	  response	  to	  the	  major	  shift	  in	  the	  global	  distribution	  of	  power,	  a	  
return	  to	  the	  "old	  normal"	  where	  no	  one	  power	   in	  geopolitical	  or	  economic	  terms	  
dominates	  the	  world.	  
